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KEEPING THE PIERRINGERPROMISE: FAIR
SETTLEMENTS AND FAIR TRIALS
PETER

B. KNAPPt

"[T] he nonsettling tortfeasors are assured . . . that they will
not pay more than their fair share of the yet-to-be-determined
plaintiff's award."l
-The Pierringer Promise
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t Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law. I received invaluable assistance while writing this article from Lucinda E. Jesson and from the faculty, staff, and
students of William Mitchell College of Law. In particular, I would like to thank Greg
Reigel, Mara Pehkonen, Maureen Kelly, Keith Rinta, and Melissa Haley for their research and analysis of many of the issues in this article. I would never have written this
article, however, if it had not been for two lawyers I worked with in private practice.
The morning of my first day as a lawyer, Wayne Faris and Jerome Miranowski asked me
to find out "what happens at trial after a Pierringersettlement." Little did they know, I
would still be working on my answers ten years later.
1. Rambaum v. Swisher, 435 N.W.2d 19, 22 (Minn. 1989).
1
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INTRODUCfION

For over thirty years now, Pierringer releases have been part of
the ebb and flow of civil litigation. In October of 1963, the Wisconsin Supreme Court decided the case of Pierringer v. Hoger. 2
Fifteen years later, in 1978, the Minnesota Supreme Court officially approved the use of Pierringer releases in Minnesota. 3 Today, the Pierringer release remains a critically important part of
modern tort litigation.
The Pierringerrelease is important because it permits a plaintiff
who has sued several defendants to settle with one and preserve
its claims against the rest. The plaintiff can then proceed to trial
against the remaining defendants. At the end of trial, the jury
will apportion fault among all the parties, including the settling
defendants. The plaintiff is entitled to recover the percentage of
damages the jury has allocated to the nonsettling defendants. 4
The plaintiff is not entitled, however, to any further recovery
from the settling defendants,5 nor may the nonsettling defendants seek contribution from the settling defendants. 6
2. 124 N.W.2d 106 (Wis. 1963).
3. Frey v. Snelgrove, 269 N.W.2d 918, 922 (Minn. 1978).
4. As a practical matter, Pierringer releases are most commonly used in products
liability and other personal injury cases involving multiple defendants. Pierringer releases may be used, however, in any case in which the jury apportions fault among the
parties. See, e.g., Bougie v. Sibley Manor, 504 N.W.2d 493,498 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993)
(considering whether a Pierringer release of a fellow employee in a sexual harassment
action required reduction of the judgment against the nonsettling defendants); City of
Menomonie v. Evensen Dodge, Inc., 471 N.W.2d 513, 516 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991) (allowing use of a Pierringer release in a negligence case for breach of fiduciary duty). In
Wisconsin, use of the Pierringer release is restricted to cases involving joint tortfeasors,
and may not be used if one defendant is sued in tort and the other in contract. Eden
Stone Co. v. Oakfield Stone Co., 479 N.W.2d 557, 563-64 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991).
Minnesota recognizes a more expansive use of Pierringer releases. Minnesota courts
have, for example, approved Pierringerreleases in cases involving construction contracts,
Barr/Nelson, Inc. v. Tonto's, Inc., 336 N.W.2d 46 (Minn. 1983); claims of fraudulent
conveyance, In re: Hancock-Nelson Mercantile Co., 95 B.R. 982, 1001-02 (Bankr. D.
Minn. 1989); and arbitration of claims relating to securities law violations, Stassen v.
Tschida, No. C2-91-2070, 1992 WL 67536 (Minn. Ct. App. April 7, 1992).
5. See, e.g., Shantz v. Richview, Inc., 311 N.W.2d 155 (Minn. 1980) (allowing settling defendant to settle without fear of future suit). Conversely, the settling defendant
cannot request return of the settlement proceeds if the jury finds the plaintiff suffered
no compensable damages. See, e.g., Rambaum, 435 N.W.2d at 22 (holding that settling
tortfeasors are dismissed with pr~udice from the lawsuit and any possible crossclaims).
See part IIA for a discussion of the problems associated with allocation of damages.
6. Under the terms of a Pierringer release, the plaintiff must indemnify the settling
defendants against any claims of contribution. See, e.g., Pierringer, 124 N.W.2d at 108;
John E. Simonett (now Justice), Release ofjoint Tortfeasors: Use of the Pierringer Release in
Minnesota, 3 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 1,3 (1977).
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Courts welcomed the Pierringer release as a principled way to
encourage settlement in complicated multi-party litigation.7
Here, at last, was a release that "correctly" implemented the principles of the tort recovery system without suffering from the disadvantages of earlier forms of settlement such as the Mary Carter
releases or the covenant not to sue. 9
When first adopted, the Pierringer release seemed to promise
something for everyone. The Pierringer release promised the
plaintiff certainty of a partial recovery and an opportunity to finance further litigation directed toward proving the remaining
defendants' fault. For the settling defendant, the Pierringer release promised the certainty of absolute repose, freeing the settling defendant from worry over any future claims for
contribution. The Pierringer release offered a promise of fairness
to the nonsettling defendant: Be assured that, no matter what
the outcome of trial, you will pay no more than your "fair share"
of the verdict. 10
This last Pierringer promise, an assurance of a fair result to the
nonsettling defendant, was hardly a trifle. The Pierringer release
offered a promise that alternative forms of releases, because of
the possibility of collusion or improper allocation of fault, were
7. See, e.g., Rambaum, 435 N.W.2d at 23 (accepting the results of Pierringerreleases
due to their strong encouragement of settlement).
8. A Mary Carter release essentially is a settlement agreement in which the settling
defendant guarantees the plaintiff a certain recovery, promises to defend itself during
the litigation and at trial, and receives a "rebate" on its settlement payment for any
increase in the plaintiffs recovery against the nonsettling defendant. Booth v. Mary
Carter Paint Co., 202 So.2d 8, 10-11 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967), uverruled by Ward v.
Ochoa, 284 So.2d 385 (Fla. 1973). The governing notion ofthe Mary Carter settlement
is that the settling defendant has an incentive to increase the liability of the nonsettling
defendant and, thus, increase the plaintiff's damage award. Mary Carter agreements
often provide that the plaintiff will pay the settling defendant a percentage of its recovery against the nonsettling defendants. See, e.g., General Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 558
S.W.2d 855, 858 (Tex. 1977) (finding the Mary Carter settlement to be a loan receipttype agreement). For additional discussion of Mary Carter agreements, see part I.D.
9. A covenant not to sue is not really a release, but rather is simply an agreement
by the plaintiff not to pursue a cause of action. See infra notes 17 & 18 and accompanying text. In most jurisdictions, at the time Pierringer releases were created, a covenant
not to sue bought the settling defendant little peace. Even though the plaintiff had
contracted not to pursue its cause, the settling defendant still faced the possibility of
defending the nonsettling defendant's contribution claim. See, e.g., Pierringer, 124
N.W.2d at 109.
10. See, e.g., Frey, 269 N.W.2d at 922 ("[T]he nonsettling defendant is relieved from
paying more than his fair share of the verdict .... "); Simonett, supra note 6, at 9 (" [T] he
non-settling tortfeasor had no cause to complain, for after all he was relieved from
paying any more than what his share might prove to be.").
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unable to make. Unfortunately, largely because of the impact
Pierringer settlements have on litigation and trial, it is a promise
the Pierringer release has too often failed to keep.
This article explores why this promise has been broken. Part
II reviews how the need for a release that permitted piecemeal
settlements in comparative fault cases led to the development
and adoption of Pierringer releases in Wisconsin and Minnesota.
Part III explores two different sets of problems: first, the appellate definition and modification of how Pierringer settlements allocate fault; and second, how Pierringer releases can change the
conduct of discovery and trial, and the impact these changes can
have on the apportionment of fault. This second set of
problems has received scant attention from the appellate courts,
and Part IV discusses possible explanations for this .. Finally, Part
V proposes solutions to some of the problems Pierringer releases
have created.
II.

AND You MAY FIND YOURSELF IN A BEAUTIFUL HOUSE . . . 11

Judges and lawyers like settlements. Lawyers like them because they are certain. Judges like them because they are efficient. Efficiency is critical because we do not have enough
judges, courtrooms, or days in the week to try even half of the
civil suits filed. 12 Settlement of complicated multi-defendant
civil litigation is particularly valuable, because complicated civil
trials can consume enormous amounts ofajudge's time and can
be expensive for the parties. However, settling multi-defendant
civil litigation can be especially difficult. Different defendants
have different tolerances for risk, and some defendants are simply far less willing to settle than others. Consequently, our civil
litigation system needs a mechanism that permits defendant-bydefendant, "piecemeal" settlement of multi-defendant civil
lawsuits.
11. TALKING HEADS, Once in a Lifetime, on STOP MAKING SENSE (Sire Records 1984).
12. At present, over 90 percent of civil suits settle prior to judgment. Figures for
the 1960s and 1970s are similar. See, e.g., 1990 Director of the Admin. Off. of the U.S. Courts
Ann. Report in REp. OF THE PROC. OF THEJUD. CoNF. OF THE U.S., 1990. Offederal cases
terminated during the twelve month period ending June 30, 1990, only 4.3 percent
reached trial. Only 9.0 percent of terminated torts cases reached trial. [d. at 153. Comparison of statistics for total civil cases terminated and total civil trials for the years 1963
to 1978 indicates that between 10.7 percent and 5.7 percent of civil cases reached trial.
1978 Director of the Admin. Off. of the u.s. Courts Ann. Report in REp. OF THE PROC. OF THE
JUD. CoNF. OF THE U.S., 1978 at 177,264.
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This was as true thirty years ago as it is today. Thirty years ago,
however, two related sets of legal problems made it much more
difficult to settle multi-defendant civil suits. First, though judges
have always favored settlements, until quite recently, tort law actually discouraged piecemeal, defendant-by-defendant settlement. In the 1960s and early 1970s, the doctrines governing
release of defendants and contribution among defendants made
piecemeal settlements perilous. Second, prior to Picrringer releases, the mechanisms available for partial settlement created a
number of other difficulties for plaintiffs and defendants. Pierringer releases developed in response to these two related sets of
problems.
A.

The Piecemeal Settlement Problem

In 1962, the year before the decision in Picrringer, settlement
of multi-defendant litigation presented serious legal complications. On one hand, a plaintiff contemplating settlement with
one of several defendants faced the possibility that release of the
one defendant would also extinguish all claims against the nonsettling defendants. 13 On the other hand, in jurisdictions which
permitted contribution among joint tortfeasors,14 a settling defendant faced the possibility of post-settlement contribution
13. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAw OF TORTS § 49, at
332 & nn.6 & 7 (5th ed. 1984). Prosser states "[u]ntil quite recent decades, most of the
courts continued to hold that a release to one of two concurrent tortfeasors was a complete surrender of any cause of action against the other, and a bar to any suit against
the other, without regard to the sufficiency of the compensation actually received." [d.
(footnotes omitted). Minnesota adhered to this rule as late as 1970. See, e.g., Holmgren
v. Heisick, 287 Minn. 386, 391, 178 N.W.2d 854, 858 (1970) (holding that the release of
one joint tortfeasor releases any others).
Today, the general rule in Minnesota is that "the release of one alleged tortfeasor
will release all others if the settlement agreement manifests such an intent, or if the
plaintiff received full compensation in law or in fact for damages sought against the
remaining tortfeasors. Bixler by Bixler v. J.C. Penney Co., 376 N.W.2d 209, 214-15
(Minn. 1985) (citing Luxenburg v. Can-Tex Industries, 257 N.W.2d 804, 807-08 (Minn.
1977».
14. Few jurisdictions permitted contribution among joint tortfeasors in the 1960s.
"The great majority of our courts ... refused to permit contribution even where independent, although concurrent, negligence had contributed to a single result. Until
the 1970's-for a period of more than a century-only nine American jurisdictions
came to the contrary conclusion, allowing contribution without legislation." KEETON,
supra note 12, § 50, at 337 & nn.l1 & 12. Wisconsin and Minnesota were among that
minority of nine jurisdictions permitting contribution. See, e.g., Skaja v. Andrews Hotel
Co., 281 Minn. 417,420, 161 N.W.2d 657, 660 (1968) (holding that where common
liability exists contribution is due as of right); Mitchell v. Raymond, 195 N.W. 855,859
(Wis. 1923) (holding that joint liability requires contribution).
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claims made by the nonsettling defendants. I5 In essence, the law
in the 1960s and early 1970s worked to discourage parties from
settlement.
At that time, a plaintiff was reluctant to grant a release that
could be construed as a complete satisfaction of any part of a
cause of action, for fear it would release all joint tortfeasors. A
defendant, on the other hand, was loathe to settle absent a complete release, for fear that anything less would permit the remaining defendants to seek contribution for a future judgment.
Although lawyers like settlement because it offers certainty, settlement of multi-defendant litigation in the early 1960s offered
little certainty to either plaintiffs or defendants.

B.

Problems of Allocation: Pre-Pierringer Settlement

The piecemeal settlement problem was not insoluble, but the
solutions available to litigants in most jurisdictions in the 1960s
and early 1970s were not particularly satisfying. The two most
common forms of partial settlement were the covenant not to
sue and the infamous Mary Carter release. In addition, in the
early 1960s, litigants in Wisconsin and a few other jurisdictions
could also settle using pro rata releases. I6 However, each of these
alternatives presented difficult problems for litigants and the
courts. The acceptance of Pierringer releases has largely been a
response to the problems created by these other forms of release, particularly the Mary Carter agreement.
1.

Covenants Not to Sue: The Problem of Uncertainty

A covenant not to sue is not really a release. It is simply a
plaintiff's agreement not to pursue a cause of action against a
particular defendant. At the time of settlement, the plaintiff executes a covenant to refrain from suing the settling defendant.
If the plaintiff already sued the defendant, the plaintiff can
15. This issue was particularly problematic in pre-Pieninger Wisconsin. At the time
Pieninger was decided, Wisconsin law permitted contribution among joint tortfeasors,
and settling defendants were subject to contribution if the plaintiff reserved its rights to
the full cause of action against the nonsettling defendant. Pierringer, 124 N.W.2d at 109.
"[W]e construed a release providing for complete discharge of the settling tort-feasor
with a reservation of rights of the full cause of action against the nonsettling tort-feasor
to be in the nature of a covenant not to sue and held the nonsettling tort-feasor's right
to contribution was not affected." [d. (citing State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Continental Casualty Co., 59 N.W.2d 425 (1953».
16. See infra note 21 and accompanying text.
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promise not to collect any portion of the judgment from the settling defendant. Tort doctrines governing joint and several liability gave a plaintiff the discretion necessary to make this
promise. A victorious plaintiff was' free to collect the judgment
from any joint tortfeasor it chose.I 7 Consequently, a plaintiff
could promise not to collect any part of a judgment from a settling defendant.
Since a covenant not to sue is not a complete release, it does
not protect a settling defendant from future contribution claims.
In jurisdictions such as Minnesota and Wisconsin, where contribution among tortfeasors was permitted, plaintiffs could not
promise settling defendants that the covenant not to sue would
protect them from future contribution actions. IS At best, the
covenant not to sue permitted a settling defendant to purchase
only a partial and uneasy peace.
2.

Partial Releases: The Problem of Misallocation

Wisconsin, unlike most other jurisdictions in the early 1960s,
had solved some of the common law problems plaguing settlement of multi-defendant litigation. Joint tortfeasors had the
right to seek contribution from one another, but Wisconsin law
provided for two forms of release that protected a settling defendant from future claims of contribution: the pro tanto and pro
rata releases.
In the late nineteenth century, Wisconsin had set aside the
common law rule that the release of one joint tortfeasor released
all joint tortfeasors, and instead provided that settlement agreements should be construed according to the intent of the parties. I9 Consequently, a plaintiff in Wisconsin had the option of
settling with one joint tortfeasor and pursuing the nonsettling
joint tortfeasors for the remainder of the claim.
17, See WILLIAM L PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS § 46, at 271 (3d ed,
1964); see also Gronquist v. Olson, 242 Minn. 119, 126, 64 N.W.2d 159, 164 (1954) (stating that receipt of part of a judgment from one tortfeasor does not relieve any other
tortfeasor from liability).
18. For an example of more modem use of the covenant not to sue, see Faber v.
Roelofs, 298 Minn. 16, 212 N.W.2d 856 (1973). In Faber, the plaintiff and settling defendant did not disclose the covenant until the close of evidence at trial. The court
stated its disapproval of secret settlements, but held that the settling defendant's presence at trial was not improper because the settling defendant was still subject to the
cross-claims of the other defendants. [d. at 861.
19. Ellis v. Essau, 6 N.W. 518, 520 (Wis. 1880).
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Exactly what constituted "the remainder of the claim" depended on which of two forms of release the Wisconsin plaintiff
chose, the pro tanto release or the pro rata release. 20 A plaintiff
opting for a pro tanto release would settle with one defendant,
and then proceed to trial against the remaining defendants. If
the plaintiff recovered a verdict against the nonsettling defendants, the trial judge would reduce the amount of the verdict by
the amount of the settlement. 21 A pro rata release allowed the
plaintiff to settle with one of two defendants, and proceed to
trial against the remaining defendant. The trial judge would reduce the amount of any verdict for damages by the settling defendant's pro rata share, which, in this case, is one-half.22
From the settling defendant's perspective, both of these alternatives were preferable to the covenant not to sue, because both
provided the settling defendant protection from future claims of
contribution. From the perspective of the plaintiff and nonsettling defendants in Wisconsin in 1962, however, both forms of
settlement posed serious problems. Both the pro tanto and pro
rata settlements created a risk of misallocation.
20. For a complete explanation of the development of Wisconsin law governing
settlements and releases prior to Pierringer v. Hoger, see Harrold J. McComas, Trrrt Releases in Wisconsin, 49 MARQ. L. REv. 533 (1965-66). Both the pro tanto and the pro rata
releases were creatures of the common law. Ellis, 6 N.W. at 520-22; Heimbach v. Hagen,
83 N.W.2d 710 (Wis. 1957). Prior to the decision in Pierringer, Wisconsin had adopted
the Uniform Joint Obligations Act. UNIF. JOINT OBLIGATIONS Aer, ch. 235, 1927 Wis.
Laws 273 (codified as amended at WIS. STAT. § 113 (West 1992». The bench and bar in
Wisconsin, however, found it difficult to fit the commonly used forms of settlem"ent
release into the statutory categories. See McComas, supra, at 535-36; see, e.g., Pierringer,
124 N.W.2d at 111 (stating that section 113 of the Wisconsin statutes applies to a tort
release only when the statute is explicitly referred to or when the parties' intent cannot
clearly be determined); Heimbach, 83 N.W.2d at 713 (declining to determine whether to
apply section 113 of the Wisconsin statutes because the parties' intent was clear).
21. Ellis, 6 N.W. at 521. The settlement in Ellis was a release under seal, and the
court could easily have construed the release as either a general release of all the
tortfeasors or, alternatively, a covenant not to sue. The Ellis court ruled that the parties
intended neither result and that the intent of the parties should govern construction of
the release. [d. at 520. The court held that the release did not discharge the nonsettling defendants, but did protect the settling defendant from future claims of contribution. [d. at 524. The amount of the plaintiff's eventual verdict, if any, would be
reduced by the amount of the settlement. [d. at 521. Voila! a pro tanto release was
created.
22. Heimbach, 83 N.W.2d at 712-13. The release in Heimbach simply provided that
the settlement amount satisfied one-half of the plaintiff's claim, and that the settling
defendant was released from any future claims of contribution. [d. The court upheld
the release because the nonsettling defendant would be required to pay only one-half
of the verdict, or that defendant's fair share. [d. at 713.
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Pro tanto Problems of Misallocation

Suppose a plaintiff entered a pro tanto settlement with a defendant for $10,000, and then proceeded to trial against the remaining defendant. If the jury returned a verdict of $20,000,
then all parties could look at the settlement and believe justice
had been done. The plaintiff would recover $20,000, half from
each of the joint tortfeasors.
However, if the verdict moves very far from that $20,000 it becomes harder to find justice. For example, if the nonsettling defendant is found to be negligent and the verdict is only $10,000,
then the nonsettling defendant will owe the plaintiff nothing.
On the other hand, if the verdict is $100,000, then the nonsettling defendant will owe the plaintiff $90,000. 23 In both situations, the judgment against the nonsettling defendant bears no
relation to that defendant's "fair share" of negligence. Consequently, the pro tanto release has created a misallocation of
damages. 24

b.

Pro rata Problems of Misallocation

As with the pro tanto settlement, the problem of misallocation
also haunts the pro rata settlement. Prior to the development of
23. In some jurisdictions, a pro tanto release did not extinguish a nonsettling defendant's right of contribution. This was, for example, the original rule under the
Unif. Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act § 5 (1939) historical note, 12 U.L.A. 58
(1975); see also PROSSER, supra note 16, § 47, at 277-78. Permitting contribution against
the settling defendant eliminates half of the problem because the nonsettling defendant will have the right to seek contribution from the settling defendant for any amount
the nonsettling defendant has paid in excess of its "fair share." Eliminating the misallocation problem, however, revives the uncertainty problem. Unless the pro tanto release
extinguishes the right of contribution, it gives the settling defendant no more peace
than a covenant not to sue. Largely for this reason, the 1955 revision to the Uniform
Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act adopted the alternative approach and discharged
a settling tortfeasor from liability for future contribution. UNIF. CONTRIBUTION AMONG
TORTFEASoRS ACT § 4(b) commissioner's comment, 12 U.L.A. 99-100 (1975).
24. There is an implicit assumption here that merits further discussion. The pro
tanto release misallocates fault if we accept the notion that the law of equal contribution
between tortfeasors is a "proper" allocation of fault This notion certainly has been
open to dispute, and the dispute about the fairness of pro rata contribution was part of
the impetus in the development of comparative fault. See supra notes 40-41 for a discussion of comparative fault in Minnesota. It seems easier to assert that ajury's allocation of individual percentage shares of comparative fault is the "proper" allocation of
fault, but that assertion also contains implicit assumptions that invite controversy. Finetuning comparative fault, however, is mercifully beyond the scope of this article. For
purposes of this discussion, fair allocation of fault is defined as an al1ocation of fault
that closely matches the apportionment a jury would have made had all parties been
present at trial to litigate their fault.
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comparative fault and contribution according to comparative allocation, the pro rata release seemed an adequate solution to the
piecemeal settlement problem. With the advent of comparative
fault, however, the pro rata release potentially created misallocation problems similar to those of the pro tanto release.
Suppose a plaintiff enters a pro rata settlement with one of two
defendants. The pro rata allocation of damages seems fair as
long as the jury equally allocates fault to each defendant. If the
fault allocation moves from equipoise, however, then the pro rata
settlement has misallocated damages. This occurs because the
plaintiff has released one-half of its claim in the pro rata settlement. The pro rata release effectively capped the nonsettling defendant's share of damages at one-half of the plaintiff's total
damages. 25 If, for example, the jury then allocated ninety percent of fault to the nonsettling defendant, the plaintiff would be
undercompensated. 26 As a matter of settlement strategy, a plaintiff in an era of comparative fault would be foolish to enter a pro
rata settlement with the defendant the plaintiff believes to be
least at fault.
Pro rata and pro tanto settlements may have presented better
solutions to the piecemeal settlement problem than covenants
not to sue. Nonetheless, these forms of release were partial solutions at best. The problem of misallocation remained, and was
sufficiently severe so as to undermine the usefulness of both the
pro tanto and pro rata settlement in an era of comparative fault.
Comparative fault is the source of the Pierringer release; the need
for the Pierringer release flows from that source.
C.

Pierringer Settlements: A Solution to the Allocation Problem?
1.

Wisconsin Invents the Pierringer Settlement

The trial bench and bar were quick to welcome the Pierringer
release because it presented an elegant solution to the problem
of piecemeal settlement in multi-party litigation. The original
"Pierringer release" grew out of an attempt to resolve a particularly complicated and protracted piece of litigation. On Novem25. The nonsettling defendant's share would be capped at one-third if there are
three defendants, one·fourth if there are four, and so on.
26. The same caveat concerning a proper allocation of fault offered above is offered here. See supra note 24. The plaintiff is undercompensated only if we accept the
notion that the jury's allocation of fault is the "proper," "correct," or "fair" allocation of
fault.
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ber 1, 1957, Loschel Pierringer, Burton Hoger, and William
Bormann were working near a gas-fired boiler at Schmitz Ready
Mix, Inc., a concrete plant in Port Washington, Wisconsin.
Hoger, Bormann, and Pierringer were all injured in an explosion caused when part of the gas piping was disconnected in an
attempt to bleed the gas line and ignite the boiler. 27
In the middle of 1958, Pierringer, Hoger, and Bormann each
brought suit against Schmitz Ready Mix, Milwaukee Gas Light
Company and several other defendants. Milwaukee Gas crosscomplained, alleging that Mathias Greisch improperly installed a
pressure regulator, causing the explosion. Three years of intensive litigation followed, but by 1962, Mr. Pierringer and the two
other plaintiffs were apparently nearing a settlement with all the
defendants except Greisch. 28
While the parties in Pierringerwere negotiating settlement, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court decided Bielski v. Shuiz.e,29 which
changed Wisconsin's common law doctrine governing contribution. Prior to Bielski, Wisconsin followed a rule that "equity was
equality"; contribution among joint tortfeasors was shared on an
equal pro rata basis. 30 Bielski changed that. Now defendants were
liable for contribution based on the jury-apportioned percentage of their comparative negligence. 31 Bielski invited a new form
of settlement that would reflect this new law of contribution. 32
Pierringer was the first of these new settlements.
27. Pierringer v. Hoger, 124 N.W.2d 106, 107 (Wis. 1963). Since the court's statement of facts is unfortunately quite terse, see also Brief of Burton E. Hoger and William
Bormann, Respondents at 3, Pierringer v. Hoger, 124 N.W.2d 106 (Wis. 1963) (No. 32);
Brief of Defendant-Respondent Milwaukee Gas Light Company at 4, Pierringer (Nos. 31
and 32); see also McComas, supra note 19. Harrold McComas, of then Foley, Sammond
& Lardner, was one of the principal architects of the release. He represented the Milwaukee Gas Light Company, and his article is a first-hand account of the development
of that first Pierringer release, complete with a copy of the text of the original release.
28. See McComas, supra note 20, at 534. Mr. McComas's description of the litigation sounds strikingly modern: "More than three years had been consumed following
commencement of the actions in multitudinous pleadings, examinations, depositions,
motions, and other procedures which are largely unavoidable when multiple parties are
involved in claims resulting from such an intricate industrial occurrence." [d.
29. 114 N.W.2d 105 (Wis. 1962).
30. [d. at 108 (citing Estate of Ryan, 147 N.w. 993 (Wis. 1914)).
31. Bielski, 114 N.W.2d at 107. For a discussion of the impact the Bielski decision
had on the settlement negotiations in Pierringer, see McComas, supra note 20, at 534-40.
32. Bielski, 114 N.W.2d at 111. In response to the defendant's argument that abolition of the common law rule of equal, pro rata contribution would complicate the law of
settlements and releases, the Bielski court stated:
In order for a plaintiff to give a release and covenant which will protect the
settling tortfeasor from a claim of contribution, the plaintiff must agree to
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On May 15, 1962, Loschel Pierringer signed the first release,
settling his claims against all defendants except Mathias
Greisch. 33 The release contained four critical elements:
1. A complete release of the Milwaukee Gas Light Company
and the other settling defendants;
2. A discharge of the claim to the extent of the "portions or
fractions or percentages of causal negligence" of the settling defendants, as later determined by the jury at trial;
3. A reservation of the claim against the remaining, nonsettling defendant; and,
4. An indemnification of the settling defendants against any
future claims of contribution. 34
With these four elegant strokes, the Pieninger release had seemingly solved the piecemeal settlement problem. The plaintiff
preserved his cause of action against the nonsettling defendant.
The settling defendants gained absolute repose, free of worry
from future claims of contribution. In the event that contribution claims were made, the settling defendants could look to the
plaintiff for indemnification.
Best of all, the Pieninger release did not seem to create
problems of misallocation, as had pro rata and pro tanto settlements. The plaintiff discharged only part of his claim-that percentage portion of fault that the jury would later allocate to the
settling defendants. This provision answered the invitation extended in Bielski. The jury would allocate a percentage of fault
to each of the negligent parties, whether they had settled out or
not. There could be no problem of misallocation, so it seemed,
because the nonsettling defendant, Greisch, would be held liable for that exact portion of damages equal to his percentage of
jury-allocated fault, no more and no less.
satisfY such percentage of the judgment he ultimately recovers as the settling
tortfeasor's causal negligence is detennined to be of all the causal negligence
of all the co-tortfeasors.
[d.

33. For a text of that first release, see McComas, supra note 20, at 533, 540-42. Mr.
Griesch, the only remaining defendant, appealed the trial court's summary judgment
dismissing the settling defendants from the action. The supreme court affinned the
summary judgment, and ruled that the releases effectively precluded the nonsettling
defendant from seeking contribution from the settling defendants. The court held that
the plaintiff could proceed to trial against the remaining defendant and recover the
percentage of negligence, if any, the jury assessed against that defendant. Pierringer v.
Hoger, 124 N.W.2d 106, 112 (Wis. 1963).
34. See McComas, supra note 20, at 540-42.
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On appeal, the Wisconsin Supreme Court enforced the release and held that it barred the nonsettling defendant's right to
contribution. 35 Consistent with the decision in Bielski and with
the intent of the release, the court ruled that the jury should
consider the negligence of all the parties, including the settling
defendants. 36 Greisch, the nonsettling defendant, would be liable for only that portion of the judgment equal to his percentage
of negligence. 37 Significantly, the Wisconsin court also ruled
that the settling defendants need not remain active participants
at trial. Greisch argued that if the settling defendants did not
participate at trial, "a proper issue of causal negligence could
not be submitted to the trier of the fact."38 The court rejected
this argument, holding that:
The issue between the plaintiff and the nonsetding defendant
... is the percentage of causal negligence, if any, of the nonsettling defendant, but such percentage of negligence can
only be determined by a proper allocation of all the causal
negligence, if any, of all the joint tortfeasors and of the plaintiff if contributory negligence is involved. The determination
of this issue between the plaintiff and the nonsetding defendant does not require the setding defendants to remain parties
because the allocation, if any, of the causal negligence to the settling
tortfeasors is merely a part of the mechanics by which the percentage of
causal negligence of the nonsettling tortfeasor is determined. 39
As argued in the following section, determining the negli-

gence of a settling defendant involves more than mere "mechanics," but this might have seemed a minor quibble in 1963. In
effect the Pierringer court said "Go home, settling defendants!
Your part here is over." In 1963, piecemeal settlement was a vexing problem for lawyers. In fact, Prosser said piecemeal settlement "has perhaps given more difficulty than any other
35. Pierringer. 124 N.W.2d at 111.
36. As the Pierringer court stated: "[H] ere. the failure to include in the apportionment question the causal negligence of the settling respondents would because of the
releases necessarily be prejudicial to the nonsettling appellant." [d. at 112.
37. The court stated in this regard:
Upon the trial the release should be given immediate effect. as it is for contribution purposes. and the judgment. if any. against the nonsettling defendant
should only be for that percentage of negligence allocated to him by the findings or the verdict. The claim for the balance has been satisfied by the plaintiff and there is no point in going through the circuity of ordering a judgment
for a larger amount and requiring the plaintiff to satisi)' it.
[d. at 112.
38. [d. at Ill.
39. Pierringer. 124 N.W.2d at 111-12 (emphasis added).
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problem."40 Following the decision in Pierringer, it must have
seemed that this difficult problem had finally been laid to rest.
2.

Today Wisconsin, Tomorrow Minnesota: Adoption of
Pierringer Releases Outside Wisconsin

During the late 1960s and early 1970s, state courts wrestled
with comparative fault and the piecemeal settlement problem.
As these states adopted comparative fault in one form or another, Pierringer-style solutions to the piecemeal settlement problem became increasingly viableY Minnesota adopted
comparative fault in 1969,42 and, shortly thereafter, lawyers in
Minnesota began using Pierringer settlements. 43
In 1977, John Simonett (now Justice) wrote an article about
the use of Pierringer releases in Minnesota, correctly predicting
40. KEETON, supra note 12, § 47, at 277 (3d ed. 1964).
4l. The three principal jurisdictions using Pierringl1Yreleases are Wisconsin, Minnesota, and North Dakota. Maine initially approved limited use of Pierringer releases, but
in the last ten years has drastically narrowed even that limited use. See part III.B. In
other jurisdictions, courts have adopted types of releases that are similar to Pierringl1Y
releases, and have used Minnesota and Wisconsin law to guide their interpretations of
their own law. See, e.g., Montana ex reL Deere & Co. v. District Court of Fifth Judicial
Dist. ex rel. Beaverhead County, 730 P.2d 396, 409 (Mont. 1986) (Gulbrandson,J., concurring and dissenting) (arguing Montana should follow Wisconsin, Minnesota and
North Dakota in adopting the percent credit rule with respect to its comparative fault
statute); Quick v. Crane, 727 P.2d 1187, 1207 (Idaho 1986) (citing Pierringer v. Hoger,
124 N.W.2d 106 (Wis. 1963»; Gauiden v. Burlington N., Inc., 654 P.2d 383, 391 (Kan.
1982) (referring to Frey v. Snelgrove, 269 N.W.2d 918 (Minn. 1978»; Hoerr v. Northfield Foundry & Mach. Co., 376 N.W.2d 323, 329-30 (N.D. 1985) (citing Frey, 269
N.W.2d 918). In some jurisdictions, lawyers have attempted to use Pierringl1Yreleases to
settle cases and included in the releases language to the effect that the releases are be
interpreted in accordance with Minnesota and Wisconsin. See, e.g., Schick v.
Rodenburg, 397 N.W.2d 464, 467 (S.D. 1987). In addition, the Uniform Comparative
Fault Act adopts an approach to settlement that is quite similar to Pierringl1Ysettlements.
UNIF. CoMPARATIVE FAULT Acr §§ 2,4, 12 U.L.A 50, 54 (Supp. 1993).
42. Act of May 23, 1969, ch. 624, 1969 Minn. Laws 1069 (codified as amended at
MINN. STAT. § 604.01-.02 (1992». For an overnew of Minnesota's adoption of comparative fault, see Michael K. Steenson, The Fault with Comparative Fault: The Problem of Individual Comparisons in a Modified Comparative Fault Jurisdiction, 12 WM. MrrcHELL L. REv.
I, 6-22 (1985). For the earliest judicial reference to the use of Pierringl1Y releases in
Minnesota, see Nebben v. Kosmalski, 307 Minn. 211, 212 n.l, 239 N.W.2d 234, 236 n.l
(1976). The release referred to in the opinion was executed in 1974. For further discussion of the use of the Pierringl1Y release in Minnesota before 1978, see part III.A.I.
43. Subdivision 5 of Minnesota Statutes section 604.01 provides that settlement payments are to be credited against the final judgment. MINN. STAT. § 604.01, subd. 5
(1992). In Rambaum v. Swisher, 435 N.W.2d 19 (Minn. 1989), the Minnesota Supreme'
Court held that the term "payments" in the statute, with respect to Pierringer settlements, "refers only to payment for that portion of plaintiff's damages representing the
settling defendant's share of liability." Id. at 23.
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that "conditions are favorable in Minnesota for the adoption of
this settlement device."44 A year later, the Minnesota Supreme
Court, citing Simonett's article as "definitive," gave official approval to the Pierringer release. 45 While the Minnesota court was
influenced by many of the same considerations that prompted
adoption of the Pierringer release in Wisconsin, there was one important difference.
By the time Minnesota adopted Pierringer releases, lawyers
were relying upon another form of release-the Mary Carter
agreement. 46 When first faced with the question of whether to
approve the use of a Mary Carter-type agreement, the Minnesota
Supreme Court stated that the validity of settlement agreements
had to be determined on a case-by-case basis. 47 The court approved the particular agreement used in that case, but stated,
"[i] t is not proper or desirable for this court to condone or condemn types of settlement agreements generically."48 The court
soon abandoned this ad hoc approach to settlement agreements.
Much has been written about Mary Carter agreements, most of
it critical of the agreements for distorting trial following settlement. At least some of that criticism prompted Minnesota, less
than a year after Pacific Indemnity, to generically condone Pierringer settlements, and offer guidelines for their use to assure a
fair trial to all parties. 49 For these reasons, Mary Carter agreements merit a closer look.

44.
45.
46.
47.
1977).

Simonett, supra note 6, at 4.
Frey v. Snelgrove, 269 N.W.2d 918 (Minn. 1978).
See infra note 49.
Pacific Indemnity Co. v. Thompson-Yaeger, Inc., 260 N.W.2d 548, 558 (Minn.

48. Id. The agreement in Pacific Indemnity was actually a hybrid settlement agreement. It shared characteristics of both the "classic" Mary Carter agreement and a loanreceipt agreement. A loan-receipt agreement is a device typically used between insurers
and insureds to allow an insured who could not otherwise afford it to maintain an
action against third parties to recover amounts the insurer would otherwise be obligated to pay. Id. at 556.
49. See Frey v. Snelgrove, 269 N.W.2d 918, 923 (Minn. 1978). There can be no
doubt that, at the time of its decision in Frey, the Minnesota Supreme Court was well
aware of the power of Mary Carter agreements to distort trial. The appellant in Frey
repeatedly characterized the Frey settlement as a Mary Carter agreement rather than a
Pierringer release, and focused its appeal on the impact the settlement had on the conduct of trial. Brief of Appellant Firestone at 20-21, Frey v. Snelgrove, 269 N.W.2d 918,
922 (Minn. 1978) (No. 47620).
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The Problem of Trial Distortion: Mary Carter Agreements

The most notorious form of piecemeal settlement is the Mary
Carter agreement. 50 A Mary Carter agreement is essentially a settlement agreement in which the settling defendant guarantees a
minimum total recovery to the plaintiff regardless of whether
the plaintiff wins or loses at trial. The settling defendant agrees
to defend itself during the litigation and at trial. The plaintiff, in
turn, promises to execute any judgment only against the nonsettling defendants. The Mary Carter agreement gives the settling
defendant a financial interest in maximizing the plaintiff's recovery against the other nonsettling defendants. The settling defendant's guaranteed payment will be offset by the plaintiff's
recovery from the nonsettling defendants. 51 The governing notion of the Mary Carter agreement is that the settling defendant
works actively at trial to increase the plaintiff's recovery and especially the plaintiff's damage award from the nonsettling
defendant. 52
50. See Booth v. Mary Carter Paint Co., 202 So.2d 8 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967), overruled by Ward v. Ochoa, 284 So.2d 385 (Fla. 1973). The Mary Carter release does not
seem to have been widely used-or at least to have drawn much attention-until the
mid-1970s. There is no indication that the Wisconsin Supreme Court had Mary Carter
agreements in mind when approving the release in Pierringer. See Pierringer v. Hoger,
124 N.W.2d 106 (Wis. 1963). Nor is there any indication in reported decisions that
litigants in Wisconsin were commonly using Mary Carter agreements or similar forms of
release in the early 1960s. One of the principal reasons for this is, no doubt, the fact
that the Wisconsin Supreme Court voided a Mary Carter-type agreement in 1934.
Trampe v. Wisconsin Tel. Co., 252 N.W. 675 (Wis. 1934). For a more complete overview of the early history of Mary Carter-type releases, see Katherine Gay, Note, Mary
Carter in Arkansas: Settlements, Secret Agreements, and Some Serious Problems, 36 ARK. L. REv.
570,572 (1983). Mary Carter agreements played a more prominent role in Minnesota's
adoption of Pierringer releases. Minnesota litigants were using Mary Carter-type agreements at the time Minnesota approved Pierringer releases, and the appellant in Frey attempted to characterize the release in that case as a Mary Carteragreement. Brief of the
Appellant at 20, Frey v. Snelgrove, 269 N.W.2d 918 (Minn. 1978) (No. 47620).
51. Mary Carter agreements may provide that the plaintiff will offset the settling
defendant's guarantee with the recovery against the other defendants on a dollar-fordollar basis. Alternatively, the agreement may provide that the guarantee will be offset
with a percentage of the plaintiffs recovery against the nonsettling defendants. See, e.g.,
General Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. 1977). In either situation, the
settling defendant still has a financial interest in working to increase the plaintiffs overall damage award, thus increasing the plaintiff's recovery from the nonsettling
defendants.
52. In Ward v. Ochoa, 284 So.2d 385 (Fla. 1973), the Florida Supreme Court defined Mary Carter agreements as "a contract by which one co-defendant secretly agrees
with the plaintiff that, if such defendant will proceed to defend himself in court, his
own maximum liability will be diminished proportionately by increasing the liability of
the other co-defendants." Id. at 387. Other definitions abound. The Texas Supreme
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Criticism of Mary Carter agreements has been unusually hostile
and shrill.53 Though courts and commentators have railed
about the clandestine nature of Mary Carter agreements,54 the
problem that has provoked the most scholarly and judicial bile is
the impact Mary Carter agreements have on trial, and particularly
Court used a broader definition in a recent decision declaring Mary Carter agreements
"void as violative of sound public policy." Elbaor v. Smith, 845 S.W.2d 240, 250 (Tex.
1992). The Elbaur court stated that "a Mary Carter agreement exists when the settling
defendant retains a financial stake in the plaintiff's recovery and remains a party at the
trial of the case." Id. at 247.
53. This criticism has also often been gratuitously misogynistic. For example one
author wrote:
Like a lady of the night, she has many aliases. In Florida she is called "Mary
Carter," but in Arizona she is known as "Gallagher." She has been branded a
"painted lady" in Florida, but she has been popular with those who use her.
Some in New York have wished her a hasty death. . .. Who is this sleazy lady?
She is a living character in the law, best described as the "guaranteed verdict
agreement." Such agreements are unholy alliances arising in cases that involved a single plaintiff and multiple co-defendants.
Larry Bodine, The Case Against Guaranteed Verdict Agreements, 29 DEF. LJ. 233 (1980).
Bodine's chastisement is not unique. See, e.g., Edward W. Mullins, Jr. & Stephen G.
Morrison, Who is Mary Carter and Why is She Saying Nasty Things About My Pre-Trial Settlements?, 23 FOR DEF., Dec. 1981, at 14 ("Who, or what is this' Mary Carter?' Is it a welldisguised femme fatale, who lures the unwary much as the fabled Lorelei? Or is it a
lawyer's 'Typhoid Mary,' claiming her unknown victims by appearing to aid others?");
Warren Freedman, The Expected Demise of 'Mary Carter': She Neuer Was Well!, 633 INS. LJ.
602, 603 (1975) ("The very existence of the 'Mary Carter agreement' makes it a contractual monstrosity which plagues the settlement aspects of liability law."); John Edward
Herndon, Jr., 'Mary Carter'Limitation on Liability Agreements Between Adversary Parties: A
Painted Lady is Exposed, 28 U. MIAMI L. REv. 988 (1974).
54. Some courts and commentators focus on secrecy as the greatest of the Mary
Carter evils. E.g., Ward v. Ochoa, 284 So.2d 385, 387 (Fla. 1973) ("Secrecy is the essence
of such an arrangement, because the court or jury as trier of the facts, if apprised of
this, would likely weigh differently the testimony and conduct of the signing defendant
as related to the non-signing defendants."). In fact, secrecy is not the "essence" of Mary
Carter releases, for reasons suggested in Ward itself. If secrecy really were the problem,
it would be a problem easily remedied. Many of the jurisdictions that have considered
the validity of Mary Carter agreements require the agreement to be disclosed to the
court and opposing counsel. See, e.g., General Portland Land Dev. Co. v. Stevens, 291
So.2d 250 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
To be sure, some lawyers might violate the law and hide the existence of a Mary
Carter agreement, particularly since the secrecy of the agreement could give an advantage to the plaintiff and settling defendant at trial. However, this same objection applies as well to the proposed solution of outright prohibition. Lawyers who break the
law and hide Mary Carter agreements would probably also be willing to break the law
and enter into Mary Carter agreements. More to the point, nothing about the Mary
Carter necessitates secrecy, and the problems Mary Carter agreements create at trial cannot be completely solved by requiring disclosure of the agreements. For an opposing
point of view, see David]. Grant, Note, The Mary Carter Agreement-Solving the Problems of
Collusive Settlements inJoint Tort Actions, 47 SO. CAL. L. REv. 1393 (1974) and Ronald W.
Eubanks & Alfonse]. Cocchiarella, In Defense of 'Mary Carter', 26 FOR DEF., Feb. 1984, at
14.
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the impact Mary Carter agreements have on the nonsettling
defendants.
Courts and commentators complain that Mary Carter agreements distort trial, robbing it of "adversary vigor."55 Jurors come
to trial expecting the plaintiff to present evidence against all the
defendants and expecting all the defendants to stand firm and
present evidence against the plaintiff. The Mary Carter settlement realigns interests and reshapes trial in a way that is contrary to these expectations. Unfamiliar with the ways of litigation
and settlement, so the argument goes, jurors will be confused
and overwhelmed by evidence or argument that runs counter to
their expectations. The method used to confound jurors may
vary from case to case. For example, counsel for the settling defendant might concede liability or damages during closing argument; alternatively, witnesses for the settling defendant might
shade their testimony to favor the plaintiff. 56
55. Grant, supra note 54, at 1402.
56. There is no better, and certainly no more popular, illustration of this concern
than a portion of the closing argument in Ponderosa Timber & Clearing Co. v. Emrich,
472 P.2d 358, 360 (Nev. 1970), a case involving claims arising from an automobile accident. All four of the defendants in the case pled defenses of contributory negligence
and assumption of risk. The plaintiff negotiated a Mary Carter settlement with two of
the defendants and then proceeded to trial. At the end of the trial, the lawyer for one
of the settling defendants gave this closing argument:
Now I am not going to stand here and make a fool of myself by telling you
people that there is any merit in the defense of contributory negligence.
There isn't. Even though that was asserted in the defenses here, as far as I am
concerned, you can forget about that. You heard no instruction on assumption of risk. So the second side of this case, if there was a second side, is out of
the case, too .... I submit to you ladies and gentlemen there aren't three sides
to this case, there aren't even two sides, there is one side, and that side is that
all of these defendants are responsible to the plaintiff, and I consider it my
duty as an officer of this court to suggest to you that in the interest ofjustice in
this case, if we are to have justice in this case, there must be a plaintiff's verdict
against all of the defendants.... This is the kind of a case when a lawyer ...
has to remind himself of the oath that he took when he was admitted to practice ... to see that justice is done.
Id. at 362-63. This segment of the closing argument is quoted in the dissent. The
Ponderosa majority upheld the trial judge's denial of the nonsettling defendants' motion
for new trial. The majority stated that there was no impropriety in the settling defendant admitting liability. "That," the court ruled, "is a matter of trial strategy," and the
settling defendant did not indicate the jury should return a verdict in excess of $20,000,
the amount of the settlement. Id. at 360. The dissent pointed out that the settling
defendant did, however, concede special damages in excess of $15,000. Id. at 363. This
quote from the closing argument is a special favorite of commentators. See, e.g., Richard Casner, Note, Admission into Evidence of a Mary Carter Agreement from a Priur Trial is
HarmfulE1TOT, 18 TEX. TECH L. REv. 997,1010 (1987); Patricia R. Morrow, Note, Is Mary
Carter Alive and Well in Michigan: Taking a Stand on Secret Settlements in Multiparty Turt
Litigation, 2 DET. C.L. REv. 605, 632-33 (1985); David R. Miller, Comment, Mary Carter
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No matter what the method, the core concern is the same:
the "unnatural" Mary Carter realignment of interests distorts trial
and misleads jurors. The plaintiff and the settling defendant will
use this warping of trial to work in concert to manufacture an
unrealistically large recovery.
Concern that Mary Carter settlements distort trial is very real
and is supported by available case law. Courts and commentators have identified and criticized a whole host of trial problems
spawned by Mary Carter releases. The litany of distortion is
lengthy, and includes problems with jury selection,57 opening
statement,58 direct examination,59 cross-examination,6o expert
witness testimony,61 and closing argument. 62 Distortion of the
trial process, in tum, creates a risk of distortion of the trial result. In short, the risk is that the Mary Carter agreement can alter
jury verdicts, causing nonsettling defendants to pay more than
their fair share. 63
Agreements: Unfair and Unnecessary, 32 Sw. LJ. 779, 789 (1978); Freedman, supra note 53,
at 620; Bodine, supra note 53, at 244.
57. See, e.g., Lum v. Stinnett, 488 P.2d 347,348 (Nev. 1971) (allowing settling defendants to "assist" nonsettling defendants with jury selection without disclosing imminent settlement); Elbaor v. Smith, 845 S.W.2d 240, 246 (Tex. 1992) (noting that during
voir dire, settling defendants' lawyers told prospective jurors that plaintiff's damages
were "devastating," "astoundingly high," and "astronomical").
58. See, e.g., Lum, 488 P.2d at 348 (noting plaintiff's complaint had focused on settling defendants, but opening statement targeted the nonsettling defendant).
59. ld. at 349.
60. ld. Here, counsel for settling defendant thoughtfully cross-examined plaintiff
about loss of income from tips, after plaintiff's counsel failed to elicit that testimony on
direct. See also Degen v. Bayman, 200 N.W.2d 134, 138 (S.D. 1972).
61. See, e.g., Elhaor, 845 S.W.2d at 246. In Elhaor, the respondent's experts testified
that respondent's doctor committed malpractice. However, in voir dire and opening
statements, respondent's attorney stated that her doctor was "heroic." ld.
62. See, e.g., Degen, 200 N.W.2d at 139. The Degen defense counsel, over objection,
stated:
I have no doubt, ladies and gentlemen, that in this case you're going to give
Billy Degen a verdict and believe me, in this argument and particularly in a
case like this, I think the attorneys have a real responsibility to be candid with
the jury, and I'm trying to be with you because this is a very serious case.
There isn't any doubt in my mind but what you're going to give Billy Degen a
verdict. There isn't any doubt in my mind that it's going to be a substantial
one.
ld. The South Dakota court ruled that the statement was improper, stating that the
jury, "[n]ot knowing the motive for the evaporation of adversary vigor" could only have
viewed the statement as "a shattering admission." ld. The court ruled that relief was
"necessary to let the adversary process put the issues in perspective." ld.
63. The implicit assumption, discussed supra at note 24, returns in full force. The
idea that a distortion in process can lead to an "erroneous" verdict assumes that there is
some "correct" apportionment of fault that jurors can divine by means of "correct" trial
of the case under consideration. This may be a controversial notion in some quarters.
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Pierringer Releases: A Solution to the Trial Distortion Problem?

The Picrringer release is assumed to be a valid alternative to the
covenant not to sue because it solves the piecemeal settlement
problem. 64 It is also assumed to be a valid alternative to the Mary
Carter agreement because it solves the trial distortion problem. 65
Whether it is a valid alternative, that is, whether it solves or creates trial distortion, turns on whether the Picrringer promise is
kept or broken: Does the nonsettling defendant pay neither
more nor less than its fair share of the verdict?

III.

You

MAy SAY TO YOURSELF "THIS
My BEAUTIFUL HOUSE •.• "

IS NOT

Although the Picrringer release is a vast improvement over its
predecessors, the Picrringer release is not faultless. Two sets of
problems vex Picrringer settlements: problems of allocation and
problems of distortion. Appellate courts created the first set of
problems by permitting one party in litigation to bear more than
its fair, jury-allocated share of fault. Part A of this section discusses these problems of allocation. Problems of distortion are
the product of the Picrringer release's impact on litigation and
trial, and are akin to the types of problems created by Mary Carter
releases. Part B explores these problems of distortion.

A.

Problems of Allocation: judicial Alteration of-the Ideal

The ideal settlement release would promise that each party to
the litigation receive that which is fair. The plaintiff would receive full compensation, and no more than full compensation,
for those damages proximately caused by the fault of the defendants. In tum, each defendant would pay for only that share of
the damages its fault had proximately caused. That is a description of the ideal; it is not a description of the Picrringer release.
This article, however, rests upon an assumption that jurors come closer to a "just," "correct," or "fair" apportionment of fault when they hear available evidence about each
party's fault and understand the motivation each party has for presenting that evidence.
64. See, e.g., Simonett, supra note 6, at 22.
65. Id. at 20. Simonett noted that "[t]he Pieningerrelease does not offend any public policy and thus can be distinguished from the somewhat discredited 'Mary Carter
Agreement,' which is kept secret from everyone and corrupts the adversary nature of
the trial." Id. (footnote omitted).
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Pierringer allocation of damages differs from the ideal in at
least four respects. 66 First, the Pierringer release promises that
nonsettling defendants will only pay their "fair share" of damages;
the Pierringer release is silent with respect to fairness to settling
defendants and plaintiffs. Second, in situations involving immune or insolvent defendants, the other defendants may be required to pay more than their allocated share of damages.
Third, a Pierringersettlement with a defendant who is an agent or
intentional tortfeasor may constitute a release of claims against
other nonsettling defendants. Fourth, at least in Minnesota, the
law is unclear whether settling defendants may seek contribution
from other defendants for amounts paid in settlement.
1.

The Promise Defined: Good Deals, Bad Deals

The ideal measure of a settlement might be whether it distributes damages fairly to all parties, including plaintiffs, settling defendants, and nonsettling defendants. This has not been the
measure of Pierringer settlements. Instead, the Pierringer promise
of fairness is only that the nonsettling defendant will pay neither
more nor less than its fair share of the plaintiff's damages. The
Pierringer promise ignores plaintiffs and settling defendants for a
very good reason. Early on, courts decided that evaluating a Pierringer settlement from the standpoint of plaintiffs or settling defendants would sacrifice certainty in the name of fairness. 67
Consider the following hypothetical. A woman is injured
when her hand is caught in a ball-return machine while she is
bowling. She sues two defendants, the out-of-state manufacturer
of the ball-return machine and the local bowling alley. Suppose
that our hypothetical plaintiff believes she has suffered damages
amounting to $100,000. She negotiates a Pierringer settlement
with the bowling alley for $30,000 and proceeds to trial against
the manufacturer of the ball-return machine. Imagine first that
the jury finds that the plaintiff has suffered damages amounting
to $100,000, for which the bowling alley is eighty percent at fault
and the manufacturer is twenty percent at fault.
66. There is a fifth deviation from the ideal, though it is less significant. An ideal
settlement structure would allocate costs as of the date of settlement according to relative fault. If trial and verdict follow a Pierringer settlement, however, costs will be assessed only against the nonsettling defendants. Peller v. Harris, 464 N.W.2d 590, 594
(Minn. Ct. App. 1991).
67. See Simonett, supra note 6, at 18.
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The negotiated Pierringersettlement now appears to have been
"unfair" in the sense that the ultimate distribution of damages is
at odds with the jury's allocation of the "actual" fault. In this
situation, the settlement is unfair to the plaintiff, who will receive compensation for only half her damages: the $30,000 settlement from the bowling alley plus the $20,000 judgment
(twenty percent of the $100,000 verdict). The settling defendant
is the beneficiary of that unfairness; absent the Pierringer settlement, the bowling alley would have faced a judgment of $80,000.
Now imagine that the jury had returned a different verdict,
finding damages of $100,000, but instead allocating one hundred percent of fault to the manufacturer and zero percent of
fault to the bowling alley. This second verdict causes the settlement to seem unfair to the settling defendant, which has paid
$30,000 but has been exonerated by the jury allocating no portion of the fault to that defendant. Here, the plaintiff is the beneficiary of the unfairness; she has received a total of $130,000 in
compensation for her $100,000 of damages.
Both these situations may seem unfair, but the unfairness is
court-approved. 68 The rationale behind judicial approval of the
results in these types of cases is twofold. First, courts reason that
the plaintiff and the settling defendant have struck an armslength deal and both should be bound by the terms of that
agreement even if it produces a distribution of damages at odds
with the trial verdict. Appellate courts simply let the chips fall
where they may. A plaintiff may well be shrewd enough to negotiate a Pierringer settlement with a defendant ultimately deter-

68. Rambaum v. Swisher, 435 N.W.2d 19 (Minn. 1989). In Rambaum, the plaintiff
negotiated a $200,000 Pierringer settlement with one defendant on the first day of trial.
Following trial, the jury verdict resulted in a total net award to the plaintiff of
$268,241.67. The jury allocated ten percent of fault to the settling defendant. The
court refused to deduct the settlement amount from the net award, and instead allowed
the nonsettling defendant only a ten percent credit for the fault apportioned to the
settling defendant. "The time to judge the fairness of the Pierringer is at the time it is
made; and if subsequent events sometimes result in a so-called 'windfall' for plaintiff,
that result is acceptable within the context of the law's strong policy to encourage settlement of disputes." [d. at 23. The result in Rambaum is completely in accord with the
rationale underlying Pierringer settlements. The case was remarkable, however, because
the result directly contravenes the clear language of section 604.01, subd. 5 of the Minnesota Statutes, requiring settlement amounts to be credited against final judgments on
a dollar-for-dollar, pro tanto basis. See supra note 41 for an earlier discussion of this
issue.
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mined to have no liability.69 That shrewd plaintiff should enjoy
the benefits of the settlement. By the same token, the canny defendant who negotiates a favorable settlement should not be
asked to pay additional damages after the jury returns its verdict. 70 A deal is a deal.
Appellate courts have used a second rationale to justify Pierringer settlements that distribute damages at variance with the
jury's allocation. Both of the hypothetical verdicts discussed
above resulted in the settling defendant paying damages in an
amount different from its jury-allocated "fair share" of damages.
On the other hand, in both situations, the nonsettling defendant
paid exactly its jury-allocated "fair share" of damages. Courts
have tended to accept the "fairness" of the Pierringer settlement
to the nonsettling defendant as a measure of the settlement's
overall fairness. 71 In short, questions about double recovery for
the plaintiff and questions about whether the settling defendant
has paid too little or too much are, as far as appellate courts are
concerned, irrelevant in assessing the fairness of a Pierringer settlement. Fairness to the nonsettling defendant defines the fairness of a Pierringer settlement. 72
69. See, e.g., Shantz v. Richview, Inc., 311 N.W.2d 155 (Minn. 1981). The Shantz
court reasoned:
It should be no concern of the nonsettling defendant how much the plaintiff
received from the settling defendant-in some cases (like this one, where it
was later determined by the jury that the settling defendant was not negligent)
plaintiff will have made the better bargain; in others, the settling defendant
will have made the better bargain.
Id. at 156.
70. See, e.g., Frederickson v. Alton M.Johnson Co., 402 N.W.2d 794 (Minn. 1987).
Plaintiff negotiated a $20,000 Pieninger settlement with defendant Hunt prior to trial.
The jury returned a verdict of $800,000 and allocated forty percent of the fault to settling defendant Hunt. Id. at 796.
71. See Shantz., 311 N.W.2d at 156. "[Alll that should concern the nonsettling defendant is that he not be required to pay more than his percentage share of the total
damages which the jury determines the plaintiff sustained. Id. See also, Austin v.
Raymark Indus., 841 F.2d 1184, 1191 (1st Cir. 1988). Austin involved a Pieninger settlement of asbestos litigation in Maine. The court stated:
If the settlement turns out to be greater than the amount equivalent to the
proportionate liability of the settling defendant, then the plaintiff, in effect,
will have made a good bargain. Conversely, if the settlement turns out to be
less than this sum, then the plaintiff will have made a bad bargain. In either
case, the nonsettling defendant's position is the same: it will only pay its fair share of the
verdict.
Id. (emphasis added).
72. This is the same test of fairness adopted in the Uniform Comparative Fault Act.
UN IF. CoMPARATIVE FAULT Acr § 6 comment, 12 U.L.A. 57 (Supp. 1993). See Thomas v.
Solberg, 442 N.W.2d 73 (Iowa 1989), for a discussion of Iowa's adoption of the proportionate credit rule.
ft
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This definition of fairness may at first seem difficult to accept.
Mter all, double recovery of damages hardly seems fair. On the
other hand, none of the other forms of settlement release are
perfectly fair. Each of the alternative forms of release measures
fairness differently and, consequently, each suffers from different types of unfairness. For example, the pro tanto release measures fairness in terms of the plaintiff's recovery.73 With a pro
tanto release, the settlement amount is subtracted from the verdict, insuring that the plaintiff's total recovery cannot be more
than the verdict. 74 The pro tanto release looks to the plaintiff's
recovery as the measure of fairness, and hence it has both the
benefits and disadvantages of that measure of fairness. The settling defendant could pay more than its fair share of the plaintiff's damages. 75 Alternatively, in a separate case, the nonsettling
defendant could also pay more than its fair share. 76 This too
may seem unfair, but in this situation it is an unfairness judged
irrelevant because the measure of the fairness of a pro tanto release is whether the plaintiff's total recovery equals the verdict
amount.
The Pierringer release strikes a different balance by accepting
the possibility of unfairness to plaintiff and settling defendant
while insisting on fairness to the nonsettling defendant. The rationale behind this measure of fairness is sound. If a Pierringer
settlement ultimately proves unfair to either the plaintiff or the
settling defendant, then they have only themselves to blame.
Unfairness arises only when the settling defendant pays too
much or too little. In theory, if the plaintiff and settling defend-

73. See supra notes 20, 23-24 and accompanying text.
74. However, if the settlement amount is greater than the verdict, the plaintiff will
not receive any damages in addition to the settlement payment.
75. Imagine that our bowling plaintiff had negotiated a pro tanto release with the
ball-return manufacturer for $80,000. Mter trial, the jury returns a verdict of $100,000,
and allocates 80% of the fault to the alley owner and 20% to the plaintiff. The ballreturn manufacturer will have paid more than its trial-determined fair share of fault.
76. For example, the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act provides that a
pro tanto settlement would discharge the settling defendant from all liability for contribution. UNIF. CoNTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS Ac:r § 4(b), 12 U.L.A. 98 (1975).
That arrangement gives certainty to the settling defendant and thus encourages settlement, though at the expense of fairness to the nonsettling defendant. In that situation,
the settling defendant might pay only $10,000 of a $100,000 verdict, leaving the nonsett1ing defendant liable for the remainder and bereft of any right of contribution.
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ant negotiate wisely, the risk of unfairness should disappear. 77
Although this rationale is theoretically sound, it has a very important logical consequence. The fairness of Pierringer releases
hinges upon fairness to the nonsettling defendant. The Pierringer promise is ultimately a promise made to nonsettling defendants: this form of release is fair because nonsettling
defendants will pay no more than their fair, jury-allocated share
of damages. 78

2.

The Promise Modified: Insolvent or Immune Defendants

Suppose that our hypothetical bowling plaintiff, in addition to
suing the bowling alley and ball-return manufacturer, had also
originally brought a claim against the maker of her bowling ball.
What happens if the jury finds that the bowling ball manufacturer is liable for a share of the plaintiff's damages, but the bowling ball manufacturer is insolvent? Are the other two
defendants responsible for the insolvent defendant's share ofliability? What if one of those defendants signed a Pierringer settlement before the trial?

a.

The Wisconsin and North Dakota Approach: Allocation
to Nonsettling Defendants

Courts have split in their approach to this set of issues. In
North Dakota and Wisconsin, courts have held that joint and several liability among nonsettling defendants survives a Pierringer
settlement. Consequently, a nonsettling defendant may be liable
for the entire verdict, reduced only by that portion of fault attributable to the settling defendants. 79 If all nonsettling defend77. In practice, Pierringer releases may result in unfairness to either the plaintiff or
the settling defendant for reasons other than unwise negotiation. See infra part II.B.
for a discussion of the problems of trial distortion.
78. Some jurisdictions have modified the promise, guaranteeing the nonsettling
defendant that it would pay no more than its jury-allocated fair share of the verdict and
also guaranteeing that the plaintiff would not recover more than the total amount of
the verdict. For example, New York adopted a hybrid approach that reduces the verdict
by either the amount received by the plaintiff in settlement or the settlor's equitable
share, whichever amount is greater. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAw § 15-108 (McKinney 1988).
See In re Eastern & S. Dists. Asbestos Litig., 772 F.Supp. 1380, 1391-92 (E. & S.D.N.Y
1991). This hybrid approach eliminates the possibility of overcompensation, but leaves
open the possibility that the nonsettling defendant might be held liable for less than its
share of the verdict. Essentially, the New York approach adapts the pro tanto measure of
fairness-the plaintiff's ultimate recovery-to a comparative fault setting.
79. Hoerr v. Northfield Foundry & Mach. Co., 376 N.W.2d 323, 330 (N.D. 1985);
Chart v. General Motors Corp., 258 N.W.2d 680, 687 (Wis. 1977).
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ants are solvent, then each will pay only its individual, juryallocated share of the verdict. If a remaining defendant is insolvent, however, then the plaintiff may collect the insolvent defendant's share of damages from any of the other solvent
defendants. Ultimately, an insolvent defendant's share of liability can be reallocated to all of the other nonsettling defendants
according to their own respective shares of fault. This reallocation can be made either via the trialjudge's reapportionment of
the judgment or a later action for contribution. 8o
Suppose the jury in our modified hypothetical returns a verdict for $100,000 and allocates fault as follows:
Plaintiff
10 percent
Bowling Alley
20 percent
Return Manufacturer 40 percent
Ball Maker
30 percent

If the ball maker is insolvent, its thirty percent share of fault will

be reallocated to the two other defendants. The alley owner will
assume responsibility for one-third of the insolvent defendant's
share and pay a total of $30,000; the return manufacturer will
assume responsibility for two-thirds of the insolvent defendant's
share and pay a total of $60,000. 81 None of the insolvent defend-

80. North Dakota law seems open to the trial judge's reapportionment of the insolvent defendant's share of damages. Hoerr, 376 N.W.2d at 333. This approach makes
sense, since it eliminates the necessity of a later separate action for contribution.
Wisconsin law is murky on this point. The court in Chart stated, "[t]here exists no
rule requiring solvent, nonsettling tortfeasors to equitably share that part of a judgment
which is uncollectible from an insolvent, nonsettling tortfeasor." Chart, 258 N.W.2d at
687. In Chart, there was only one remaining solvent, nonsettling defendant. Chart declined to permit that nonsettling defendant to seek from the settling defendant recovery of a share of the insolvent defendant's portion of damages. The court's rationale
was that the recovery would ultimately come from the plaintiff who, under the terms of
the settlement, stepped into the shoes of the settling defendant. This would make settlement too uncertain, the Chart court reasoned. [d. at 688. Later Wisconsin courts
have, however, permitted equitable allocation among nonsettling defendants of an insolvent or immune defendant's share of damages. Raby v. Moe, 441 N.W.2d 263, 271
(Wis. Ct. App. 1989); Larsen v. Wisconsin Power & Light Co., 355 N.W.2d 557, 564
(Wis. Ct. App. 1984). But see Leverence v. PFS Corp., 504 N.W.2d 874 (table), 1993 WL
233338, at *4 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993) (refusing to impute settling defendant's share of
immune defendants' liability to plaintiffs).
81. To determine the alley owner's additional responsibility: (1) total the remaining solvent defendant's percentage shares of fault (here, the total is 0.60); (2) divide
the alley owner's individual share of fault by that total (0.20 divided by 0.60); (3) multiply that result (0.33) by the insolvent defendant's share of the verdict.
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ant's share is reallocated to the plaintiff, even though the jury
has found that the plaintiff was also at fault. 82
Wisconsin and North Dakota courts have not, however, held
that joint liability survives among nonsettling and settling defendants. Suppose that our hypothetical plaintiff in the bowling
alley case negotiates a Pierringersettlement with the return manufacturer. At trial, the jury returns a verdict for $100,000 and allocates fault as set out above. Under Wisconsin and North Dakota
law, the alley owner will be liable for a total of $50,000, its own
share of the verdict plus the entire share of the insolvent defendant's verdict. 83 In Wisconsin and North Dakota, the Pierringer
settlement effectively transfers all responsibility for the insolvent
defendant's share of liability to the nonsettling defendants. 84

82. See Chart, 258 N.W.2d at 687 & n.8. In Chart, the jury allocated three percent of
fault to the plaintiff. The nonsettling defendant, General Motors, requested that any
portion of the insolvent defendant's liability be allocated to the plaintiff on the basis of
her fault. Instead, the Wisconsin court reallocated all of the insolvent defendant's
share of fault to General Motors. Id. at 687-88. Apparently North Dakota has not considered the issue of the effect that fault of the plaintiff may have on reallocation of an
insolvent defendant's share of liability. The court did not reach this issue in Hoerr because the jury allocated no fault to the plaintiff. Hoerr, 376 N.W.2d at 325. Yet the Hoerr
court did rely on Chart in reaching its result. Id. at 333.
83. Hoerr, 376 N.W.2d at 332; Chart, 258 N.W.2d at 687. For other courts reallocating an insolvent defendant's liability to nonsettling defendants, but refusing to reallocate that share of liability to settling defendants, see In re Eastern & Southern Districts
Asbestos Litigation, 772 F. Supp. 1380, 1403 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1991), and the cases cited
therein, and affirming on this issue In re Brooklyn Navy Yard Asbestos Litigation, 971
F.2d 831, 845 (2d Cir. 1992), and the cases cited therein. The In re Brooklyn cases did
not involve PierTingersettiements, but instead centered upon interpretation of New York
statutory law. In re Brooklyn, 971 F.2d at 845. However, the district court's analysis did
rely in part on Hoerr and Chart. Eastern & S. Dists., 772 F. Supp. at 1402.
84. At least one Wisconsin court has criticized this approach. Raby v. Moe, 441
NW.2d 263, 272 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989), rev'd on other grounds 450 N.W.2d 452 (Wis. 1990).
The RrWy court relied on Larsen V. Wisconsin Power & Light Co., 355 N.W.2d 557 (Wis.
Ct. App. 1984). At issue in Larsen was the proper allocation of the fault of defendants
immune to judgment. The court ruled that the immune defendants' fault should be
reallocated to the other defendants. Id. at 563-64. However, none of those defendants
had settled with the plaintiff prior to trial. RrWy misrelied on Larsen because RrWy reallocated part of the insolvent defendant's fault to a settling defendant but there were no
settling defendants in Larsen. Additionally, for an early, pre-Chart critique of the Wisconsin approach authorized by the Larsen judge, see Gordon Myse, The Problem of the
Insolvent Contributor, 60 MARQ. L. REv. 891,903 (1977). Judge Myse authored the Larsen
decision.
In Leverence v. PFS Corp., 504 N.W.2d 874 (table), 1993 WL 233338 (Wis. Ct. App.
1993), the court critiqued the decisions in Larsen and RrWy. Relying on Chart, the Leverenee court refused to apportion the liability of an immune defendant. Id. at *5.
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The Minnesota Approach: Allocation to All Defendants

Minnesota has adopted a far different approach to reallocation of an insolvent defendant's share of liability. Minnesota's
comparative fault statute provides that if a defendant's share of
liability is "uncollectible," then that share must be reallocated
among all the other parties, including the plaintiff, "according
to their respective percentages of fault."85
Imagine our hypothetical plaintiff had gone to trial against all
three defendants and a Minnesota jury returned the same verdict, awarding the plaintiff $100,000, and allocating fault as
follows:
10 percent
Plaintiff
20 percent
Bowling Alley
Return Manufacturer 40 percent
Ball Maker
30 percent
Once again, suppose that the judgment against the ball maker is
uncollectible. Under Minnesota's statutory scheme, one-seventh
(ten-seventieths) of the insolvent defendant's share of fault will
be reallocated to the plaintiff. The plaintiff's judgment will be
reduced by $4285.71; the alley owner will be liable for its own
share plus two-sevenths of the insolvent defendant's share, paying a total $28,571.43; and the return manufacturer will pay
$57,142.85, its own share plus four-sevenths of the insolvent defendant's share. s6
Minnesota has also adopted a different approach for reallocation of an insolvent defendant's fault if one or more of the solvent defendants has settled pursuant to a Pierringer release. In
Hosley v. Armstrong Cork CO.,S7 the Minnesota Supreme Court held
that an insolvent defendant's fault should be reallocated not
only to the plaintiff and the nonsettling defendants, but also to
85. MINN. STAT. § 604.02, subd. 2 (1992). The 1978 Minnesota Comparative Fault
Act's loss reallocation provision is virtuaIly identical to the loss reallocation provision
contained in the 1977 Uniform Comparative Fault Act. Compare UNIF. CoMPARATIVE
FAULT ACT § 2(d), 12 U.LA 50 (Supp. 1993) with 1978 Minn. Laws 840. For a review of
the development and analysis of Minnesota's loss reaIlocation provisions, see Michael K.
Steenson, Comparative Fault and Loss Reallocation, MINN. TRIAL LAw. July-Aug. 1981, at 8.
86. For example, the procedure for calculating the alley owner's responsibility for
its portion of the insolvent defendant's share of liability is as follows: (1) total the remaining solvent defendants' percentage shares of fault and the plaintiff's share of fault
(here, the total is 0.70); (2) divide the alley owner's individual share of fault by that
total (0.20 divided by 0.70); (3) multiply that result (0.29) by the insolvent defendant's
share of the verdict.
87. 383 N.W.2d 289 (Minn. 1986).
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the settling defendants. 88 In Minnesota, a Pieningerrelease does
not transfer responsibility for the insolvent defendant's share of
liability from the settling to nonsettling defendant. Instead, unless the settling parties make some other agreement, reallocation of the insolvent defendant's liability will be the same
whether or not there has been a Pierringer settlement.
The principal objection to the Minnesota approach is that it
discourages settlement. 89 The Wisconsin Supreme Court stated
that reallocation of the insolvent defendant's fault to the settling
defendant would defeat the purpose of settlement. 90 "The monetary value of the release ... would become contingent on the
lawsuit, and thus the certainty and rationality of fixing the rights
and liabilities between the settling defendant and plaintiff would
be lost."91
This concern, however, may be overstated. For plaintiffs, the
value of every Pierringer release is contingent upon trial. It is
true, however, that the Minnesota approach introduces a measure of uncertainty for settling defendants. The settling defendant risks later responsibility for paying its share of any
uncollectible portion of the judgment. The best way to deal with
this concern is to allow a would-be settling defendant and the
plaintiff to negotiate who should bear this risk.
Under the approach the Minnesota Supreme Court adopted
in Hosley, plaintiffs and would-be settling defendants remain free
to allocate this risk to plaintiff instead of the settling defend88. [d., 383 N.W.2d at 292-93. The same approach was adopted by the First Circuit
Court of Appeals interpreting the effect of a Pierrin~ release in a Maine settlement. See
Austin v. Raymark Indus., 841 F.2d 1184, 1195-96 (1st Cir. 1988) (citing Hosley v. Armstrong Cork Co., 383 N.W.2d 289 (Minn. 1986».
89. North Dakota offered a different objection to the Minnesota approach. Hoerr
v. Northfield Foundry & Mach. Co., 376 N.W.2d 323 (N.D. 1985). "Although the Hosley
majority's result might well be considered an 'expected consequence' of Pierrin~ settlements in Minnesota, the same cannot be said of ... Pierrin~ settlements in North
Dakota. [d. at 331. This is a fine objection, especially in light of Minn. Stat. § 604.02,
subd. 3. It is, however, an objection that should only work once. The Hoerr court could
have solved this problem by mandating prospective reallocation, thus making the Minnesota approach an "expected consequence of all future North Dakota Pierrin~
settlemen ts.
90. Chart v. General Motors Corp., 258 N.W.2d 680, 687-88 (Wis. 1977).
91. [d. at 688. The court in Chari was concerned about the value of the settlement
to the plaintiff because it assumed that the plaintiff's general promise to indemnify the
settling defendant for future claims of contribution would work to make the plaintiff
liable for the settling defendant's share of any uncollectible judgment. However, as set
forth in Hosley, 383 N.W.2d at 294, discussed infra at notes 92-94 and accompanying
text, the settling parties can negotiate a different arrangement.
K

K
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ant. 92 The Pierringer release in that case expressly provided that
the plaintiff would indemnify the settling defendants for "all
claims based on the amount of any subsequent judgment determined to be uncollectible."93 The settling defendants, consequently, did not pay any additional amount for their reallocated
shares of the insolvent defendant's liability. Instead, the plaintiff's judgment was reduced by this amount. 94
Minnesota's approach is preferable to the approach taken in
Wisconsin and North Dakota. It is fundamentally unfair to allow
a plaintiff and a settling defendant to contract to have a nonsettling defendant bear the entire risk of uncollectibility. However,
this is exactly what the North Dakota and Wisconsin approach
permit. Rather than allocating all of the risk caused by an insolvent co-defendant to nonsettling defendants, the Minnesota approach distributes that risk among all defendants. In addition,
the Minnesota approach also permits the plaintiff and the settling defendant to negotiate an alternative allocation of that risk.
What happens if the parties fail to include express language in
the agreement concerning reallocation in the event of insolvency? By definition, all Pierringer releases contain a plaintiff's
general promise to indemnify the settling defendants for claims
of contribution. In at least one case, the Minnesota Supreme
Court has apparently held that this sort of general promise could
also bind a plaintiff to indemnify a settling defendant for damages reallocated as a result of insolvency.95 The result seems at
odds with Hosley, but makes sense in light of the language in Pier92. Hosley v. Armstrong Cork Co., 383 N.W.2d 289, 290 (Minn. 1986).
93. [d. at 294.
94. [d. at 294 & n.3. The Hosley decision seems to tum on the plaintiff's express
agreement in the Pierringer releases to indemnify the settling defendants for any reallocation pursuant to the Minnesota statute. See generaUy, Sharon L. Van Dyck, Comment,
Loss Allocation and Reallocation in Minnesota: A Road in Need of Repair, 13 WM. MITCHELL L.
REv. 389 (1987).
95. See Frederickson v. Alton M. Johnson Co., 402 N.W.2d 794, 797 (Minn. 1987).
The Pierringer release contained no specific language concerning reallocation in the
event of insolvency. Brief for Appellant at A-80-82, Frederickson v. Alton M. Johnson
Co., 402 N.W.2d 794 (Minn. 1987) (Nos. CI-85-2102, C3-85-2117). The court's broad
construction of the Pierringer general indemnity provision seems inappropriate in light
of its insistence on strict construction of indemnity provisions in other contracts. See,
infra note 96, for the effect of the release language contained in the Pierringer release.
Courts in other jurisdictions have reached a similar result, however, apparently without
concern for the existence of any reallocation statute or the presence of specific language in the release promising indemnification for reallocation of uncollectible damages. See Austin v. Raymark Industries, Inc., 841 F.2d 1184, 1195-96 (1st Cir. 1988)
(noting that language in release apparently promised only that the plaintiff would "sat-
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ringer settlements releasing the settling defendant from all further claims. Ideally, the issue of reallocating uncollectible
damages should be expressly addressed in every Pierringer settlement. However, absent express language permitting the plaintiff to seek uncollectible damages from the settling defendant,
the Pierringer release provisions should bar the plaintiff from asserting a later claim against the settling defendant for reallocation of uncollectible damages. 96
3.

The Promise in Hiding: Release of Agents and Intentional
Tortfeasors

As part of the solution to the piecemeal settlement problem,
the Pierringer release made it possible for a plaintiff to release its
claim against one defendant without worry that the release
would extinguish its claims against all other defendants. There
are, however, at least two situations in which release of a single
defendant could constitute an effective release of the plaintiff's
claims against other defendants as well. Both of these situations
can ensnare unwary plaintiffs. The first arises when a plaintiff
releases an agent and attempts to recover damages from the
principal; the second, when a plaintiff releases an intentional
tortfeasor.
a.

Release of Agents

The most common of these two situations is the release of an
agent. In Minnesota and North Dakota, if the plaintiff negotiates a Pierringer settlement with an agent, that settlement may
constitute a release of the plaintiff's claims against the principal.
If the plaintiff's claim against the principal is one of vicarious
isfy" contribution claims against the settling defendants and "stand in the shoes" of
those defendants).
96. Typically. Pierringer agreements contain release language promising that the
plaintiff will "refrain forever from instituting any other action or making any other demand or claim of any kind against" the settling defendant. See MDLA RELEASE
DESKBOOK (Eric J. Magnuson. ed .• 2d ed. 1990). F-3. The Pieninger agreement used in
Frederickson contained identical release language. Brief for Appellant at A-80-82. Frederickson v. Alton M.Johnson Co .• 402 N.W.2d 794 (Minn. 1987) (Nos. Cl-85-2102. C3-852117). The Frederickson court reached the right result for the wrong reason. The language in the Pieningeragreement should not have been construed to require the plaintiff to indemnify the settling defendant for any reallocation claims; it should have been
construed to bar the plaintiff from making any such claims. I am indebted to my colleague. Professor Daniel Kleinberger. for his willingness to share insights on this issue
during conversations with me.
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liability, any release of the agent removes the basis of that vicarious liability claim. 97
This rule permits the nonsettling principal to avoid liability
and, in a sense, pay less than its share of damages. On the other
hand, a principal may be entitled to indemnity from its agent for
vicarious liability stemming from the agent's negligent acts.
Since a plaintiff agrees in a Pierringer settlement to indemnify the
settling agent, the plaintiff steps into the shoe of the agent and
becomes liable to the principa1. 98 As a general rule, release of
an agent also releases the principa1. 99 Plaintiffs need to be alert
to the fact that a Pierringersettlement creates no exception to this
doctrine. 100 Caution suggests that a plaintiff avoid settlement
with an agent or employee if the plaintiff intends to pursue
claims against the principa1. 101
97. Minnesota law seems clear on this point. See, e.g., Reedon of Faribault, Inc. v.
Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Underwriters, Inc., 418 N.W.2d 488 (Minn. 1988). Reedon involved
an action for negligent failure to provide adequate fire insurance, wherein Pierringer
settlement with the negligent agent constituted a release of the vicariously liable insurance company. [d. at 488. See also Hoffman v. Wiltscheck, 411 N.W.2d 923 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1987) (finding that a Pierringer settlement with a negligent driver constituted release of the vicariously liable employer).
North Dakota law is also fairly clear. See, e.g., Horejsi by Anton v. Anderson, 353
N.W.2d 316 (N.D. 1984). In Hurejsi a guardian ad litem brought an action on behalf of
a child injured by his caregiver. The court found release of the caregiver constituted a
release of the injured child's parents, who had employed the caregiver. [d. at 318. But
see McLean v. Kirby Co., 490 N.W.2d 229 (N.D. 1992). The McLean plaintiff brought an
action for damages against the salesman who raped her, the vacuum cleaner distributor
who employed him, and the vacuum cleaner manufacturer that employed the distributor as an independent contractor. [d. at 232. The court found the Pierringer settlement
with the distributor did not serve to release the manufacturer. [d. at 244.
Wisconsin law is not as clear on the vicarious liability question. Wisconsin has
ruled that a Pierringer settlement of a minor-driver did not constitute a release of claims
against the parent-sponsor. Swanigan v. State Farm Ins. Co., 299 N.W.2d 234 (Wis.
1980). But see, Schroeder v. Pedersen, 388 N.W.2d 927 (Wis. Ct. App. 1986) (holding
release of active tortfeasor constitutes release of joint venture partners from vicarious
liability); St. Clare Hosp. v. Schmidt, Garden, Erickson, Inc., 437 N.W.2d 228, 232-33
(Wis. Ct. App. 1989) (" [W]here a settling plaintiff assumes the strictly liable tortfeasor's
share of responsibility for the damages, leaving only ordinarily negligent tortfeasors as
defendants, the plaintiff has assumed all of the liability attributable to the product.").
The decision in St. Clare has been subject to criticism. See Komanekin v. Inland Truck
Parts, 819 F. Supp. 802, 811 (E.D. Wis. 1993) ("By distinguishing this case from St. Clare,
the court does not want to give added authority to that decision, the logic of which is
not terribly compelling.").
98. Hoffmann, 411 N.W.2d at 926.
99. Reedon, 387 N.W.2d at 446.
100. [d.
101. This is certainly true if the claims against the principal or employer are based
on a theory of vicarious liability. Other types of claims against principals or employers
may survive a Pierringer release. In Bougie v. Sibley Manor, Inc., 504 N.W.2d 493 (Minn.
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Release of an Intentional Tortfeasor

In Wisconsin, a negligent tortfeasor is entitled to seek indemnity from an intentional tortfeasor. This rule has an enormous
impact on Pierringer settlements. In Wisconsin, a plaintiff who
releases a defendant later found to have acted intentionally has
also released its claims against all other negligent tortfeasors. In
Fleming v. Threshermen's Mutual Insurance Company,102 the plaintiff
brought an action for injuries received from a sawed-off shotgun
blast. 103 Plaintiff negotiated a Pierringer settlement with the person who fired the gun, and proceeded to trial against the person
who made the gun available. Because the jury found that the
settling defendant acted intentionally, the Wisconsin court ruled
that the nonsettling defendant could seek indemnity.l04 Since
the Pierringer release provided that the plaintiff indemnified the
settling defendant, the plaintiff lost his right to recover from the
nonsettling defendant. 105
Though Minnesota once adhered to a similar rule, the advent
of comparative fault has largely eroded this doctrine. l06 Unfortunately, Minnesota law is not completely clear, and at least one
court has suggested that an intentional tortfeasor might still be
held to have lost its right to contribution. 107 This approach was
rejected in a situation involving a Pierringer release, however. In
Ct. App. 1993), the court of appeals considered a Pieningt'T settlement in a sexual harassment case. The plaintiff released her supervisor who she claimed had harassed her.
Id. at 495. Plaintiff proceeded to trial against her former employer, as well as the employer's owners. Id. at 496. The Pieningt'Tsettiement with the supervisor did not release
the plaintiff's claims against the employer. In fact, the court held that the claims
against the employer based upon the "sexually charged" atmosphere of the office did
not rest upon theories of liability based upon the supervisor's knowledge and actions.
Id. Consequently, the court of appeals upheld the trial judge's refusal to deduct the
settlement amount from the judgment against the employer! Id.
102. 388 N.W.2d 908 (Wis. 1986).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 911.
105. Id. at 912. In City of Menomonie v. Evensen Dodge, Inc., 471 N.W.2d 513 (Wis.
Ct. App. 1991), the Wisconsin court declined to extend Fleming to include a claim for
indemnity based on a negligent tortfeasor's responsibility to disgorge profits in excess
of damages. Id. at 515.
106. See, e.g., Kempa v. E.W. Coons Co., 370 N.W.2d 414, 420 (Minn. 1985)
(" [S] tatutory comparative fault ... and apportionment of damages ... have had a significant impact on the principles of loss allocation embodied in the doctrines of contribution and indemnity.").
107. SeeJendro v. Honeywell, Inc., 392 N.W.2d 688, 690 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (citing Kempa v. E.W. Coons Co., 370 N.W.2d 414, 420-21 (Minn. 1985». For a more
complete discussion of indemnity issues in the comparative fault context, see Steenson,
supra note 42, at 36 n.158.
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Lange v. Schweitzer,108 the plaintiff entered a Pierringer release and
proceeded to trial against the remaining defendants. The jury
found that one of the remaining defendants was negligent. The
plaintiff argued that the defendant's liability stemmed from a
statutory violation, and this "illegal act" barred the defendant
from seeking contribution. Consequently, the plaintiff argued,
the verdict amount ought not be reduced by the amount of fault
allocated to the settling defendant. The court rejected this
argument. 109
Parties negotiating a Pieninger settlement should not have to
speculate about whether one of the defendants will lose its right
to contribution. The necessity of this sort of speculation
prompted one commentator to write:
In my youth, I had an older cousin who delighted in telling
me that there were snakes under my bed and if I so much as
put a toe down, they would work their venomous will upon
me. I was fairly certain there weren't any snakes, but it took a
literal and figurative leap of faith to make it from bed to bathroom to answer nature's call. I relive that experience every
time I am confronted with the prospect of a Pierringer
Release. 1 10

The trepidation is understandable. As the law stands, plaintiffs
in both Wisconsin and Minnesota are well advised to refrain
from settling with defendants who might be intentional
tortfeasors.
4.

The Promise Befuddled: Survival of Contribution Rights

Does a nonsettling defendant have the right to contribution
from a settling defendant? When a plaintiff signs a Pieninger release, the plaintiff makes a promise to indemnify the settling defendant against any future claim for contribution made by one
of the nonsettling defendants. As a practical matter, courts do
not require nonsettling defendants to pay the plaintiff the entire
judgment amount and then bring an action for contribution
against the settling defendant, who is in tum indemnified by the
plaintiff. III Since the plaintiff is ultimately responsible for the
108. 295 N.W.2d 387 (Minn. 1980).
109. [d. at 390.

110. J. Michael Riley, N(1IIJ, About that Pieninger . .. , 16:4 WIS. ACAD. OF TRIAL LAw. 30
(1993).
Ill. See, e.g., Haase v. R & P. Indus. Chimney Repair Co., 409 N.W.2d 423, 427 (Wis.
Ct. App. 1987) (holding that a settling defendant's contribution under a Pierringer re-
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settling defendant's share of liability, courts simply reduce the
judgment by that amount,l12
What about the opposite situation? Should a settling defendant recoup the amount it has paid in settlement through contribution from a nonsettling defendant? Clearly not. Allowing a
settling defendant a right to contribution would effectively subject the nonsettling defendant to liability both for its own share
of fault and for the settling defendant's share of faultY3 This
would be an outright betrayal of the Pierringer promise.
a.

A Clear "No": North Dakota

Of the three principal Pierringer jurisdictions, only North Dakota has legislatively resolved this issue. North Dakota statutory
law flatly prohibits a settling defendant from obtaining contribution from other, nonsettling defendantsY4 Houser v. Gilbert1l5
tested the applicability of this statute to situations involving Pierringer settlements,l16 Houser involved a wrongful death action
brought as the result of a tractor-trailer accident that occurred
near a sugar beet fieldY7 The plaintiff sued the driver (Gillease is imputed to the plaintiff); Fleming v. Threshermen's Mut. Ins. Co., 388 N.W.2d
908, 911 (Minn. 1986) (same).
112. The Pierringer release does not extinguish the right of the nonsettling defendant to seek contribution. Instead it transfers liability for contribution to the plaintiff.
See, e.g., Haase, 409 N.W.2d at 427; Fleming, 388 N.W.2d at 911.
113. This occurs because the nonsettling defendant is paying an amount that is
greater than his or her share based upon the jury's allocation of fault. Permitting a
settling defendant to seek contribution may create additional inequities. See Charles v.
Giant Eagle Markets, 522 A.2d 1, 4 n.3 (Pa. 1987). The court in Charles stated:
Moreover, settlement is not encouraged by allowing the settling defendant the
right of contribution against the remaining defendants. Although the possibility of a recoupment of losses may be an additional incentive to the settling
defendant who may make a bad bargain, it would be unjust to the plaintiff
who makes an unfavorable settlement arrangement and is bound by it. Nor is
it appropriate to allow the settling defendant to enhance his bargaining based
upon the subsequent trial, the consequences of which his agreement was
designed to avoid.
[d.

114. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-38-01(4) (1992). The statute provides that "a tort-feasor
who enters into a settlement with a claimant is not entitled to recover contribution
from another tort-feasor whose liability for the injury or wrongful death is not extinguished by the settlement nor in respect to any amount paid in a settlement which is in
excess of what was reasonable." [d. The North Dakota statute is identical to the U niform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act. See UNIF. CoNTRIBUTION AMONG
TORTFEASORS Acr § l(d), 12 U.LA 63 (1975).
115. 364 N.W.2d 62 (N.D. 1985).
116. [d. at 65.
117. [d. at 63. Houser was killed when his tractor-trailer collided with a tractortrailer driven by Gilbert. Gilbert settled with Fraedrich and Houser. Gilbert and
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bert), the trucking company that owned one of the vehicles involved (Fraedrich), and the farmer that owned the sugar beet
field (Brakke). 118
The plaintiff negotiated a Pierringer settlement with Gilbert
and Fraedrich for $250,000. Neither of the two settling defendants was dismissed and both continued to participate at trial to
press Fraedrich's claim against Brakke for property damage to
his truck. The jury returned a verdict allocating one hundred
percent of fault to Brakke, awarding Houser $378,000 in damages, and awarding Gilbert and Fraedrich $47,000.1l9 Gilbert
and Fraedrich then brought a motion seeking contribution from
Brakke for $250,000, the amount of their Pierringer settlement
with the plaintiff. 120
Despite the fact that the jury found Gilbert and Fraedrich
bore zero percent of the fault for the accident, and even though
both Gilbert and Fraedrich participated as parties at trial, the
North Dakota Supreme Court held that the two settling defendants were barred from seeking contribution from Brakke. 121
The court relied on the North Dakota statute in prohibiting the
contribution action,122 but the decision would have been correct
even without the statute.
A post-Pierringer verdict is not reduced by the settlement
amount but only by the settling defendant's percentage share of
fault. Consequently, the plaintiff in Houser was entitled to keep
the settlement proceeds and also collect one hundred percent of
the verdict amount from the nonsettling defendant. This result
permitted the plaintiff to recover a total greater than the jurydetermined damages, but the result was deemed fair because
Brakke, the nonsettling defendant, would be required to pay no
more than his jury-allocated share of the verdict (one hundred
percent of $378,000). If the settling defendants had been perFraedrich remained parties against Brakke, seeking property damages to Fraedrich's
tractor-trailer. [d. at 64.
118. [d. at 63. Many other third-, fourth-, and fifth-party defendants eventually became parties to the suit, but their role in the accident has no bearing on the issues
arising out of the Pierringer settlement. See, e.g., Houser v. Gilbert, 389 N.W.2d 626
(N.D. 1986) (concerning insurance coverage issues related to the accident).
119. Houser, 364 N.W.2d at 64.
120. [d.
121. [d. at 65.
122. [d. The court noted "in view of our conclusion that [the statute] bars Gilbert
and Fraedrich from recovering contribution, we need not determine whether the language of the release they secured ... would also bar contribution.· [d. at 66.
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mitted to seek contribution from Brakke, he could have ended
up paying a total of $628,000 for the plaintiff's damages. That
result would be fatal to the Pierringer definition of fairness.
The law should flatly prohibit a settling defendant from bringing a claim for contribution against a nonsettling defendant.
When a defendant signs a Pierringer release, that defendant signs
away the right to seek contribution from the other nonsettling
defendants. The law should, however, permit a settling defendant to bring a claim for its own damages against a nonsettling
defendant. Signing a Pierringer release should not preclude a defendant from continuing a cause of action for damages the defendant has sustained that are the fault of the other nonsettling
defendants. The Houser court also drew this distinction:
Fraedrich could continue his claim against Brakke for damages
to his truck,123 but could not seek contribution from Brakke for
his settlement with the plaintiff. 124

b.

A Confusing "Maybe": Minnesota

North Dakota has a statute that forbids a settling defendant
from seeking contribution from a nondefendant as well as a
supreme court decision that clearly applies that rule to Pierringer
settlements. Neither Wisconsin nor Minnesota has a statute similar to North Dakota's, and their courts have yet to write local
versions of Houser. 125 Consequently, the law in bothjurisdictions
is uncertain. Unfortunately, in Minnesota the law is not only uncertain, it is confusing.
Minnesota law is confusing for at least three reasons. 126 First,
in the best of situations it can be difficult to distinguish between
contractual rights to indemnity and contribution from equitable
common law rights to indemnity and contribution. A Pierringer
release creates new contractual rights of indemnity, further complicating matters. 127 Second, courts sometimes fail to draw clear
123. Houser v. Gilbert, 364 N.W.2d 62, 64 (N.D. 1985).
124. Id. at 65.
125. With respect to Wisconsin law, see discussion infra at note 133.
126. It is probably unfair to blame all the confusion on just three factors. For a
discussion of other factors contributing to this wealth of confusion, including Minnesota's own statutory response to contractual indemnity, see Daniel S. Kleinberger, No
Risk Allocation Need Apply: The Twisted Minnesota Law of Indemnification, 13 WM. MITCHELL
L. REv. 775 (1987).
127. The complexity arises because new contractual rights exist between the plaintiff
and settling defendant. Questions of indemnity and contribution frequently arise in
construction litigation involving breach of contract and negligence claims. Asking ju-
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lines between a defendant's right to seek damages for its own
injuries and a defendant's right to seek damages for amounts
paid in settlement. A Pierringer settlement may have no impact
on the former, but it should absolutely preclude the latter. 128
Third, courts have been too quick to turn to pre-Pierringer, precomparative fault authority when looking for answers to questions about contribution and indemnity following a Pierringer settlement. 129 Principles and considerations that once justified
post-settlement contribution and indemnity are simply no longer
applicable.
In the days before official approval of Pierringer releases, it
made sense for Minnesota courts to permit a settling defendant
to seek contribution from a nonsettling defendant. For example, contribution was permitted in one case where a defendant
negotiated a global settlement with one defendant that also rerors to allocate fault in these cases creates indemnity law problems that are positively
Byzantine. See, e.g., Lemmer v. IDS Properties, Inc., 304 N.W.2d 864 (Minn. 1980). In
Lemmer, defendants Waco and IDS settled with the plaintiff prior to verdict. [d. The
jury exonerated IDS and Waco and allocated 20% of the fault to the plaintiff and 80%
to another defendant, Turner. IDS and Waco sought indemnity and contribution from
Turner. [d. at 866. IDS had a contractual right to indemnity from Turner; Waco did
not. [d. at 869. Turner attempted to characterize the settlement as a Pierringer release
and argued that IDS and Waco were barred from attempting to recoup their settlement
payments. Brief for Appellant at 19-20, Lemmer v. IDS Properties, Inc., 304 N.W.2d 864
(Minn. 1980) (Nos. 50327,50463). The court held that both IDS and Waco were entitled to indemnity. [d. at 869-70.
128. See, e.g., Stewart v. Frisch, 381 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986). Stewart arose
out of a wrongful death action involving a motorcycle accident. Wayne Denzer was
driving a motorcycle when it struck a horse owned by Donald and Mary Frisch. Ricky
Stewart, a passenger on the motorcycle, was killed in the accident. The trustee for
Stewart's next-of-kin sued Denzer and the Frischs. The trustee negotiated a $17,500
settlement with Denzer, and the two parties signed a Pierringerrelease in 1982. In 1985,
Denzer moved to be dismissed from the lawsuit. The trial judge granted his motion
and dismissed Denzer's indemnity and contribution cross-claim against the Frischs. At
trial, the jury allocated 80% of the fault to settling defendant Denzer, 20% to decedent
Stewart, and none to the Frischs. [d. at 1-2. Six years after the accident and two years
after the trial, Denzer brought an action for damages against the Frischs. See Denzer v.
Frisch, 430 N.W.2d 471 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988). The Frischs argued that the earlier jury
allocation of fault collaterally estopped the claim. The court of appeals disagreed;
"[C]entral to our analysis is that the foregone cross·daim was for contribution/indemnification, not for Denzer's damages." [d. at 474. Denzer's complaint in the later action
contained no claim for recoupment of the settlement paid to Stewart. Brief for Appellant at 12, Denzer v. Frisch, 430 N.W.2d 471 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (No. C7-88-871).
129. See, e.g., Lemmerv. IDS Properties, Inc., 304 N.W.2d 864, 868-70 (Minn. 1980).
Though Lemmer concerned contractual rights to indemnity, much of the court's decision seems to rest on pre-Pierringer settlement law. [d. at 868-69 (discussing the "common liability rule" which allowed contribution "where both parties were liable to the
plaintiff, but where they were not joint tortfeasors.").

HeinOnline -- 20 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 39 1994

40

WILliAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 20

leased all other defendants, but the other defendants paid nothing toward the settlement. 130· Contribution may seem just in
situations where the settling defendant has "overpaid," and this
overpayment results in some benefit or unjust enrichment to the
nonsettling defendant. 131
With Pierringer settlements, however, this rationale does not
work. The nonsettling defendant must pay its jury-allocated
share of the verdict regardless of the dollar amount of the Pierringer settlement. Pierringer releases are supposed to eliminate
the possibility of unjust enrichment of the nonsettling defendant. Consequently, there is no reason to permit a settling defendant to seek equitable contribution or indemnity following a
Pierringer settlement. 132 Permitting this kind of claim for contribution exposes a nonsettling defendant to liability for more than
its jury-allocated share of fault. This is an outright betrayal of
130. Samuelson v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. RR, 287 Minn. 264, 178 N.W.2d 620
(1970). Defendant Rock Island Railroad settled the entire claim, obtained a general
release from the plaintiff, and sued a third-party defendant for contribution to the set·
tlement. The court reasoned that permitting the third-party defendant "to avoid contribution on the ground that Rock Island's liability has not been adjudicated would ...
unjustly enrich third-party defendant, a result which the remedy of restitution upon a
claim of either contribution or indemnity was intended to prevent." [d. at 624. But see
Tefft v. Tefft, 471 A.2d 790, 795 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1983) (holding that settlement by all tortfeasors bars an action for contribution).
131. Problems of unjust enrichment might also warrant contribution in situations in
which the amount of the settlement is deducted from the verdict (a pro tanto reduction). If the settlement is large enough (or the verdict small enough) and the settlement amount is set-off against the verdict, the nonsettling defendant may end up
paying less than its jury-allocated share of the verdict. See, e.g., Charles v. Giant Eagle
Mkts., 522 A.2d 1, 2 (Pa. 1987). Contribution is barred in this situation under the
Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, which was the model for the North Dakota statute discussed supra in part II.AA.a. UNIF. CoNTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS
Acr § l(d), 12 U.L.A. 63 (1975). If the verdict amount defines the plaintifrs "true"
damages, unjust enrichment of the nonsettling defendant is not possible in jurisdictions that discount verdicts on a pro rata basis. Assume that the plaintiff and the settling
defendant negotiate a $50,000 settlement. The plaintiff proceeds to trial against the
one remaining defendant, and the jury awards a total of only $20,000 in damages. The
verdict will be discounted by one half (the settling defendant's pro rata share), and the
nonsettling defendant will pay $10,000. The settling defendant may have overpaid, but
that overpayment has not resulted in any tangible benefit to the nonsettling defendant.
132. A Pierringer release should not, however, extinguish a settling defendant's
claims against the nonsettling defendant for damages stemming from the settling defendant's own injuries. Nor should a Pierringerrelease extinguish a settling defendant's
independent contractual right to indemnity, should one exist. Both these kinds of
claims survive a Pierringer settlement. Cautious practice would counsel that the release
expressly preserve these claims. The holding in Denzer, 430 N.W.2d at 474, however,
suggests that the release need not expressly reserve a settling defendant's claim for
damages for its own injuries.
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the Pieningerpromise. Both Minnesota and Wisconsin 133 should
clarify their law concerning contribution and indemnity following a Pieninger settlement. As it stands, Minnesota law is an open
invitation to error. 134
B.

Problems of Distortion: The Effect of Pierringer Releases on
Litigation and Trial

If the world and litigation were ideal, the Pieninger settlement
would promise that each party will pay damages in accordance
with its jury-allocated share of fault. As shown in the previous
section, the Pieninger settlement cannot make this promise. Instead, the Pieninger settlement offers an alternative promise: that
the nonsettling defendant will pay no more nor less than its
share of fault. Unfortunately, because of the impact that the
Pieninger settlement has on the litigation and trial process, this
promise too is broken. Appellate decisions have offered insufficient guidance regarding the conduct of litigation and trial following a Pieninger settlement.
133. A recent Wisconsin Court of Appeals decision may accomplish this. In Unigard
Ins. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., No. 93-1644; 1994 WI.. 120022 (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 12,
1994), Unigard sought contribution and indemnity for amounts it paid pursuant to a
Pierrin~settlement in another action. Following the trial in that action, the jury determined that the plaintiffs injuries were caused solely by the plaintiff's own fault and the
fault of other nonparty tortfeasors. Unigard argued it was entitled to contribution and
that it had expressly reserved its right to seek contribution and indemnity from other
nonsettling tortfeasors in the Pierrin~ release. Stating that "Unigard could ... reserve
only what it rightfully and equitably possessed," the Wisconsin court ruled that a Pierrin~ release extinguishes a settling defendant's right to seek contribution and indemnity for amounts paid in settlement from any other tortfeasor, whether a named party
or not. [d. at *4. The Wisconsin court further noted that permitting a second trial of
the same fact situation "would defeat all the salutary effects of Pierrin~ law and frustrate judicial economy." [d. at n.6.
134. At least one court may have accepted this invitation. Alumax Mill Prods. v.
Congress Fin. Corp., 912 F.2d 996 (8th Cir. 1990) (applying Minnesota law). Alumax
involved the financial collapse of an aluminum fabricator. Alumax, an aluminum supplier, filed a suit for lender and accountant liability. The lender, Congress Financial,
filed a separate suit against the two accountants. Alumax negotiated a Pierrin~-type
settlement with the two accountants. Citing Denzer v. Frisch, the court of appeals held
that the settlement had no preclusive effect on the settling accountants. [d. at 1012. It
is unclear what claims the settling defendants preserved against Congress Financial
since the district court dismissed with prejudice the accountants' claims for contribution and indemnity. [d. at 1001. The Pienin~ settlement also should have precluded
the accountants from asserting claims for settlement payments in any other suit because
Congress Financial suffered no independent harm from the accountants other than by
Alumax's claims.
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The result is that Pieningersettlements have distorted litigation
and trial in some instances. Pierringer settlements create
problems at trial due to difficulties surrounding proof of the settling defendant's fault. At a trial following a Pierringer settlement, the plaintiff no longer has an incentive to prove the
settling defendant's fault, but the remaining defendants do. Unfortunately, problems created by the settlement may undermine
the parties' ability to prove the settling defendant's fault or absence of fault. Following a brief overview of the guidance appellate courts have given about the conduct of trial after a Pierringer
settlement, this section explores the problems of proof these settlements may create at trial.
These problems of proof at trial are the most obvious way Pierringer settlements distort the litigation process. However, like a
stone dropped in a pond these problems at trial ripple outward.
A Pierringer release not only disrupts determination of fault at
trial, it may also distort the process of discovery. This distortion
of trial and discovery may, in turn, create problems affecting settlement. In the backwash of these problems, the Pierringer settlement can no longer keep its promise that the nonsettling
defendant will pay neither more nor less than its fair share of
fault.
1.

Guidance from the Bench

In the thirty years since Pierringer v. Hoger,135 few reported decisions have given much attention to the conduct of litigation
and trial following a Pieningersettlement. The Pieningerdecision
itself offers little practical guidance to the trial court. Pierringer
states only that the settling defendant need not participate in
trial and that the settling defendant's fault should be included in
the special verdict apportionment question. 136
For specific advice about litigation and trial following a Pierringersettlement, a trialjudge must turn to the decision in Frey v.
Snelgrove. 137 Frey offers four specific suggestions for what should
be done following a Pierringer settlement:

135. 124 N.W.2d 106 (Wis. 1963).
136. [d. at 111-12.

137. 269 N.W.2d 918 (Minn. 1978).
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Lawyers for the settling parties should notify the trial
court immediately after the Pierringersettlement and have
the terms of the agreement made part of the record. 138
The settling defendants should be dismissed following
settlement unless the settling defendant must "continue
as a party for the limited purpose of defending against
the surviving cross-claim."139
If the settlement is executed during trial, the court
should inform the jury that there has been a settlement
in order to explain the settling defendant's absence. 140
Generally, however, the amount paid in settlement
should never be submitted to the jury.141

To a certain extent, each of these suggestions is appropriate, and
each is helpful to a trial judge faced with a mid-trial Pierringer
settlement. Unfortunately, in the fifteen years following the Frey
decision, there has been virtually no further development in this
area of the law.

2.

Problems of Proof at Trial

Mary Carter releases are held in disrepute largely because of
the impact they may have on a trial. 142 Courts disapprove of
Mary Carter releases because they rob a trial of its adversarial
vigor. 143 The defendant settling pursuant to a Mary Carter release works to maximize the plaintiff's recovery from other de-

138. Id. at 923.
139. Id.
140. Id. If settlement occurs before trial, tlle court has discretion whether to disclose tlle settlement to tlle jury. In tllis situation tllere is admittedly no sudden and
mysterious disappearance of a defendant that needs explanation. If, however, a settling
defendant's fault is at issue and evidence of tllat fault will be introduced at trial, the
trial court should disclose tlle existence of tlle settlement to tlle jury. Wit110ut tllis
disclosure, the jury will be left to guess why tlle settling defendant is not in court. See
Mujwid v. Gillis, No. C3-92-2461, slip op. at 3 (Minn. Ct. App. May II, 1993) (finding
that the fault or negligence of the settling defendant should be submitted to the jury
where tlle record contains evidence of its fault or negligence). For an eloquent dissent
to tlle rule of disclosure by a recent commentator, see Riley, supra note 110, at 30.
141. Frey, 269 N.W.2d at 923.
142. See supra notes 50 tllrough 63 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
use of Mary Carter releases.
143. See Com Exch. Bank v. Tri-State Livestock Auction Co., 368 N.W.2d 596, 599
(S.D. 1985); Degen v. Bayman, 200 N.W.2d 134, 139 (S.D. 1972); City of Houston v.
Sam P. Wallace & Co., 585 S.W.2d 669, 674 (Tex. 1979).
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fendaOnts. l44 This ostensibly leaves jurors bewildered and unable
to "correctly" apportion fault. 145
Although courts have been quick to comment on and criticize
the problems Mary Carter releases create at trial,146 they have
given scant attention to the similar problems Pierringer releases
may create. 147 Unfortunately, Pierringer settlements may also rob
a trial of at least a portion of its "adversary vigor." This happens
for two reasons. First, like Mary Carter releases, Pierringer settlements create an incentive for participants at trial to take positions contrary to those the jury would expect. Second, Pierringer
settlements may deprive the jury of much of the evidence concerning the settling defendant's liability.

a.

Who Will Prove the Settling Defendant's Fault?

Following a Pierringer settlement, a plaintiff no longer has any
incentive to prove the settling defendant's fault. Recalling our
hypothetical with the bowling plaintiff, assume that the plaintiff
settles with the ball-return manufacturer. The jury will consider
the manufacturer's fault in its special verdict, and the plaintiff
has an interest in seeing that the percentage of fault allocated to
the manufacturer is as small as possible. If the jury allocates one
hundred percent of fault to the settling manufacturer, the plaintiff will recover nothing from the nonsettling defendants. If the
jury allocates zero percent of fault to the settling manufacturer,
144. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
145. Once again we face the metaphysical issue of what the "correct" apportionment
of fault might be. Is a fault allocation determined by a jury somehow more fair than a
fault allocation arrived at through settlement negotiation? What is meant by "fair"? A
fault allocation is fair if it is the same as the allocation the jury would have made had
there been no settlement. This is my definition. It is also the definition appellate
courts implicitly adopt when making the Pierringer promise-the Pierringer release is fair
because the nonsettling defendant will pay no more or less than its jury-allocated share
of fault. This promise only has substance if it means the nonsettling defendant will pay
no more or less (or not a whole lot more or less) than it would have absent the
settlement.
146. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
147. The effect Pierringerreleases may have on trial has not gone completely unrecognized. In his seminal article on Pierringer releases, Simonett warned:
The Pierringer release may place the non-settling tortfeasor at a tactical disadvantage, but this does not taint the release's validity.... Also, the non-settling
tortfeasor finds himself no longer able to cross-examine the settling tortfeasor
as an adverse party. . .. He can attempt to place the blame for the tort on the
settling tortfeasor who is no longer defending himself, except to the extent
plaintiff's counsel indirectly assumes his defense.
Simonett, supra note 6, at 21-22.
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the plaintiff will recover its judgment from the bowling alley and
also keep the settlement proceeds from the manufacturer.
Following the Pieninger settlement between the plaintiff and
the ball-return manufacturer, the bowling alley has an incentive
to prove the manufacturer's fault. The bowling alley wants the
jury to allocate as large a share of fault as possible to the manufacturer because this will work to reduce the bowling alley's own
share of fault. 148 If the bowling alley fails to introduce evidence
of the manufacturer's fault, then the trial judge may direct a verdict in favor of the manufacturer. 149
In other words, a Pieninger release does more than simply give
the bowling alley owner the incentive to prove the fault of the
manufacturer. The Pieninger settlement transfers to the remaining defendant the burden to prove the settling defendant's fault.
If the remaining defendant fails to meet that burden, the trial
court can direct a verdict against the settling defendant and
strike that defendant's name from the special verdict list of parties to whom the jury will allocate fault.I5o
Whether the nonsettling defendant is easily able to meet this
burden of proof depends on two factors: (1) the timing of the
Pieninger settlement; and (2) the nonsettling defendant's trial
strategy. Suppose our hypothetical bowler negotiates a Pieninger
settlement with the manufacturer well before trial. Because of
148. The bowling alley has a second alternative to reduce its share of fault. The
bowling alley could also attempt to prove that the plaintiff is at fault for her own accident. If this has been the alley's strategy all along, if the alley planned on concedingor actively arguing-that the manufacturer was not at fault, then the Pierringer release
will have no adverse impact on the bowling alley's strategy.
149. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 622 v. Keene Corp., 495 N.W.2d 244, 250 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1993) (reasoning that "given Keene's failure to introduce evidence sufficient
to justify sending the question of the codefendants' fault to the jury, the trial court
properly declined to instruct on this issue"); see also Nelson v. Trinity Medical Ctr., 419
N.w.2d 886, 890 (N.D. 1988) (holding that, in a medical malpractice case, the trial
judge's refusal to submit the fault of settling doctors to the jury was not erroneous
because the nonsettling hospital had failed to introduce evidence of the doctors' fault).
150. If the nonsettling defendant introduces no evidence of the settling defendant's
fault, the plaintiff should affirmatively request that the fault of the settling defendant
not be submitted to the jury. If the plaintiff fails to object to submission of the settling
defendant's fault, then the court will include the settling defendant in the allocation
question. The jury is apparently then free to allocate fault to that defendant, and this
allocation will not normally be disturbed on appeal. See Bloom v. Hydrotherm, Inc.,
499 N.W.2d 842, 845-46 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993).
Likewise, an appellate court ought not reverse a trial judge's decision not to submit
a settling defendant's fault to the jury if the remaining defendant failed to object at the
time. See Fire Ins. Exch. v. Adamson Motors, No. C7-93-1680, 1994 WL 120025 (Minn.
Ct. App. Apr. 12, 1994).
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the advance notice of settlement, the bowling alley can accordingly plan to prove the manufacturer's fault at trial. 151 Conversely, if the settlement is made during trial, the nonsettling
defendant may be caught by surprise and have to dramatically
alter its trial strategy.152 Suppose the bowling alley planned to
defend by focusing on the plaintiff's own conduct, claiming that
the ball-return was in safe working order and the accident was
completely the result of the plaintiff's carelessness. The bowling
alley now has two choices. First, it can change its strategy in midtrial, which may be difficult to do without damaging its credibility with the jury. Second, it can allow the case to proceed without presenting any evidence against the manufacturer and hope
that the jury is persuaded that the plaintiff is principally at
fault. 153
If the nonsettling defendant presents evidence of the settling
defendant's fault, then the plaintiff finds itself in an awkward
position. Unless the plaintiff allows that evidence to come in uncontested, it will have to offer proof exonerating the settling defendant. In other words, if the bowling alley submits evidence of
the manufacturer's fault, the plaintiff must offer rebuttal evidence that the manufacturer was innocent of fault. Since the
plaintiff sued and settled with the manufacturer, the jury may
have trouble accepting this evidence and the jury may doubt the
plaintiff's credibility.154
151. As argued in the following section, this may not be as easy as it would be if the
manufacturer were still a party to the suit.
152. It seems reasonable to believe that a significant proportion of Pierringer settlements are negotiated on the eve of trial or during trial. By my calculations, of the 48
most recent Minnesota court of appeals decisions indicating the timing of Pierringer
settlement in the case, one-fourth indicate that the settlement occurred at trial or immediately before.
153. Has settlement changed anything if the bowling alley simply follows its planned
strategy and presents evidence of the plaintiff's fault? Settlement has increased the risk
associated with the bowling alley's strategy. If no evidence against the manufacturer
comes in, then the jury will not have the opportunity to allocate fault to the manufacturer. If the strategy fails and the jury is persuaded that the plaintiff is not at fault, then
100% of fault may be allocated to the bowling alley. If the manufacturer were still at
trial, the plaintiff would have an incentive to present evidence of the manufacturer's
fault, and the jury might allocate some fault to the manufacturer. In short, absent settlement, there is another party to whom the jury may allocate fault in case the defense
strategy fails.
154. So what? Don't plaintiffs deserve this problem? In situations where plaintiffs
settle with defendants who may bear a substantial share of fault for the damages, we can
criticize the plaintiffs' strategy and say that they have created a problem they deserve. If
plaintiffs, however, believe they do not have the ability to introduce credible evidence
minimizing the settling defendant's fault, then plaintiffs may decide not to settle. The
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In short, a Pierringer settlement realigns interests at trial in
somewhat the same manner that a Mary Carter settlement
realigns those interests. Mter a Pierringer settlement, defendants
may have an unexpected incentive to present evidence against
one another, and plaintiffs may face the challenging prospect of
defending settling tortfeasors.
b.

How Will the Settling Defendant's Fault be Proved?

Pierringer releases realign the interests of litigants. This realignment may not only be contrary to what many jurors perceive as the natural interests of the remaining parties, but also
may be contrary to a party's own interest in forming its trial strategy. Even in the best of situations, it may be awkward for the
plaintiff and remaining defendants to prove or disprove the settling defendant's fault. Unfortunately, trials are s~ldom the best
of situations. Frequently, proof of the settling defendant's fault
is not simply awkward, it is nearly impossible. When a Pierringer
settlement is reached, a great deal of evidence about a settling
defendant may evaporate.
t.

Loss of Plaintiff's Evidence

First, the plaintiff's own evidence implicating the settling defendant may never reach the jury. Let us return to our hypothetical with the bowling alley. Following the settlement with the
ball-return manufacturer, the plaintiff no longer has any incentive to present evidence of the manufacturer's fault. I55 This evidence would reduce the plaintiff's recovery from the bowling
alley. To be sure, the bowling alley will want to prove the manufacturer's fault. The alley, however, will not have equal access to
the plaintiff's expert testimony-probably the most important
evidence implicating the manufacturer. If the plaintiff's expert
has been deposed, then the bowling alley can introduce the depjustice system favors settlements-even piecemeal settlements-so the structure of trial
following a Pierringer settlement should not discourage settlement. Remember, also,
that the Pierringer promise is that the nonsettling defendant will pay neither more nor
less than its share of fault. If the bowling alley can introduce uncontradicted evidence
of the settling manufacturer's fault, then the bowling alley may end up paying less than
its fair share of the plaintiffs damages.
155. Actually, the plaintiff has almost no incentive to present this evidence. The
plaintiff may chose to introduce some evidence of the settling defendant's fault simply
to avoid a loss of credibility with the jury. In particular, if the plaintiff's testifying experts opined on the settling defendant's fault in earlier reports, the plaintiff may want
the experts to testify about this to avoid impeachment on cross-examination.
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oSItIOn. If there is no deposition, the alley owner may have to
rely on the expert's written report or responses to interrogatones. All of this is a poor substitute for live testimony.
n.

Absence of the Settling Defendant

Unlike the situation following a Mary Carter agreement, once
the ink has dried on the Pierringer release, the settling defendant
disappears from trial. Some courts have held that a settling defendant's absence is simply not a problem. 156 This view seems
myopic. In all likelihood, the settling defendant will be the best
source of information about its own fault or lack thereof.
In our hypothetical, the bowling alley may well believe that
close questioning of the manufacturer or its employees is critical
to prove the manufacturer's fault. The manufacturer's testimony may also be the best evidence the plaintiff has of the manufacturer's absence of fault. The remaining parties to the
litigation have a legitimate interest in introducing the settling
defendant's testimony and the jury needs to hear that testimony
in order to apportion fault among all the parties. As other
courts have recognized, determination of an absent party's fault
"may well lack the vigor and clarity which would be present if the
absent party were actually in the litigation."157
156. See, e.g., Young v. Verson Allsteel Press Co., 524 F. Supp. 1147, 1152 (E.D. Pa.
1981). The plaintiff in Young settled with defendant Verson pursuant to a "Griffinft
release-a Pennsylvania form of release similar to a Pierringer release. The nonsettling
defendant, Federal Pacific Electric, objected to the settlement on the grounds that it
would be prejudiced ifVerson were absent from trial. Id. at 1148. Relying on the decision in Pierringer, the Pennsylvania court stated:
It is simply a non sequitur to maintain, as Federal does, that without the presence of Verson, the factfinder cannot determine the extent of Federal's comparative negligence vis-a-vis Young. Nothing prevents Federal from
introducing whatever probative evidence of Verson 's culpability it may otherwise have offered with Verson present at trial.
Simply put, there is no practical economic benefit that will inure to Federal from Verson's presence. The potentially dramatic effect of pointing at an
acquiescent defendant is not a sufficient reason to force Verson to bear the
additional expense of appearing at trial after settling with plaintiff and after
signing a release that provides Federal with all the economic benefits which
Federal could have achieved after a trial in which Verson was present.
Id. at 1152 (footnote omitted).
157. Bowman v. Barnes, 282 S.E.2d 613,620 (W. Va. 1981). Bowman involved a question of whether absent tortfeasors should be included in the jury's allocation of fault.
Although the decision looks to Pierringer for some guidance, Bowman did not arise out
of an absence due to settlement. Id. at 620. See also, Gaulden v. Burlington Northern,
Inc., 654 P.2d 383, 391 (Kan. 1982). Gaulden involved a Pierringersettlement. The majority held that the settling defendant's fault should have been submitted to the jury
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In some situations, absence of the settling defendant is a problem easily solved. If the settling defendant is within the court's
subpoena power, any of the remaining parties can compel the
settling defendant to appear and testify at trial. 158 Returning to
our bowling hypothetical, the settling defendant is the manufacturer, an out-of-state corporation. If the trial judge dismissed
the manufacturer from the lawsuit, as would occur following
most Pierringer settlements, the manufacturer and its employees
may be beyond the court's subpoena power. In these situations,
it is reasonable to expect that the remaining parties will have
deposed the manufacturer's key employees. Although these
depositions can be used at trial,159 a deposition is a poor substitute for live testimony. The jury will be left to decide the fault of
foUowing the Pierringer settlement, but that settling defendant was properly dismissed
from the litigation. [d. at 392. The concurring justice contended:
[T] he railroad [the remaining defendant] is entitled to have James [the settling
defendant] remain as a party in the lawsuit regardless of James' settlement
with the plaintiff. This permits aU issues of liability and damages to be litigated within the context of the original lawsuit where aU potentiaUy responsible parties are available. Whether James continues to retain counsel to
represent him as a party in the action, however, is a matter entirely within his
discretion.
[d. at 395. See also, Gross v. Midwest Speedways, Inc., 260 N.W.2d 36, 44 (Wis. 1977)
(dissent).
158. At trial, the plaintiff and the remaining defendants wiU aU be able to examine
the settling defendant. At least one authority has suggested, however, that the party
calling the settling defendant wil1 be unable to cross-examine the witness. See Simonett,
supra note 6, at 21 & n.99 (citing MINN. R. CIV. P. 43.02). Rule 43.02 permits crossexamination of not only the hostile or adverse witness, but also of "a witness identified
with an adverse party." MINN. R CIV. P. 43.02. Most often, this means that an employee
or agent of the adverse party may be cross-examined. But see Hemze v.. County of
Renvil1e, 255 Minn. 115, 117, 95 N.W.2d 596, 597 (1959) (concluding that since the
county is not an "adverse party" under Rule 43:02, its employee is not subject to being
cal1ed for cross-examination). However, trial judges have wide discretion as to when
cross-examination is warranted, and "[a]l1 that need be established is that the relationship between the witness and the adverse party is such that the witness appears to have
sufficient interest in the litigation so as to be identified with the adverse party." 2 DAVID
F. HERR & ROGER S. HAYDOCK, MINNESOTA PRAcnCE, CIVIL RuLES ANNOTATED § 43.7 (2d
ed. 1985 & Supp. 1993). In most trials fol1owing a Pierringersettlement, the remaining
defendant wiU attempt to establish the settling defendant's fault and the plaintiff wil1
attempt to minimize that fault. In this type of situation, it makes good sense for a trial
judge to exercise discretion and permit the remaining defendant to cross-examine the
settling defendant.
159. MINN. R. CIV. P. 32.01 (c) (2). This Rule permits a party to use the deposition of
an out-of-state witness "unless it appears that the absence of the witness was procured by
the party offering the deposition." [d. In a sense, the plaintiffs decision to settle procures the absence of the settling defendant. Should this bar the plaintiff from introducing the deposition? No, unless the remaining defendant can show that the settlement
was negotiated principaUy to procure the absence of the settling defendant.
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a party never seen and assess the credibility of witnesses never
heard.
iii.

Absence oj the Settling Defendant's Experts

From a plaintiff's standpoint, the most important evidence
lost following a Pieninger settlement may well be the testimony of
the settling defendant's experts. In many cases, the most potent
evidence rebutting a settling defendant's fault will be that defendant's own expert testimony. Once the plaintiff and the settling defendant have reached agreement, the burden of proving
the settling defendant's fault passes to the remaining defendants. For example, in our hypothetical, after the plaintiff settles
with the manufacturer, the bowling alley will attempt to prove
the manufacturer's fault. The plaintiff, in turn, will have both
the incentive and responsibility for rebutting whatever proof the
bowling alley offers. Otherwise, the plaintiff will find its recovery
reduced because a portion of the fault is allocated to the
manufacturer.
As argued above, a Pieninger settlement at or near trial may
catch the remaining defendants off guard. In our hypothetical,
it is possible that the bowling alley will have no expert of its own
to testify about the manufacturer's fault. It is virtually certain,
however, that the plaintiff will have no expert of her own to rebut testimony about the manufacturer's fault. Our plaintiff cannot hire a "backup" expert who will be available to testify, in the
event of settlement, that the manufacturer's product was not defective after all. A plaintiff cannot develop evidence exonerating
a defendant.I6o The one and only source of expert opinion supporting a settling defendant will likely be the settling defendant's own experts. Must a party simply forego all expert
testimony proving the settling defendant's fault? Following the
Pieninger settlement, our plaintiff has three possible avenues to
this testimony.
The first avenue is through the settling defendant itself. The
settling defendant may be willing to allow the plaintiff access to
its experts before and during trial, in effect permitting the plain160. Why not? Because, assuming that no Pierringer settlement is made before trial,
the plaintiff cannot be certain it will be able to settle with a particular defendant. Consequently, to survive summary judgment of its claims, a plaintiff must develop a prima
facie case against each of the defendants. Development of evidence favorable to any
one defendant would effectively scuttle the plaintiff's own claims against that defendant, as well as the plaintiff's ability to negotiate a settlement with that defendant.
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tiff to hire those experts. If so, then the plaintiff and settling
defendant can make this arrangement part of their Pierringcr settlement. 161 Without the settling defendant's agreement, however, the attorney work product doctrine may bar the plaintiff
from obtaining access to these experts. 162 If settling defendants
were routinely willing to allow plaintiffs access to their experts,
this problem would be solved. It is unrealistic to expect, however, that defendants will always be so accommodating. It is easy
to imagine situations in which a defendant would be reluctant to
permit plaintiff's counsel ready access to an expert. In most
product liability cases, as well as many professional malpractice
cases, a defendant may have strategically sound reasons for refusing to allow a plaintiff to have access to its experts. 163
The second avenue to the settling defendant's expert testimony is more traditional. If the expert has been deposed, the
plaintiff may simply introduce the deposition transcript. Ideally,
the plaintiff will have anticipated the possibility of settlement
and will have obtained a videotaped deposition of the expert. If
there is no deposition, the plaintiff will have to rebut expert testimony of fault with the settling defendant's expert witness reports or interrogatory responses that were sent to the plaintiff.
In all likelihood, these reports or interrogatory responses will be
far less complete and far less compelling than live testimony. 164
161. For example, see the Pierringer settlement negotiated between the plaintiff
Alumax and the accounting defendants in Alumax Mill Products, Inc. v. Congress Financial Corp., 912 F.2d 996 (8th Cir. 1990), which allowed the plaintiff access to the
defendants' experts. Brief of Appellee Alumax Mill Products, Addendum Pierringer Settlement Agreement at 7, Alumax Mill Prods., Inc. v. Congress Fin. Corp., 912 F.2d 996 (8th
Cir. 1990) ("H & Nand McGladrey further agree that Alumax may call, without the
necessity of a trial subpoena, any witnesses from H & N or McGladrey, or under their
control, including, but not limited to, H & N's or McGladrey's expert witnesses (at
Alumax's expense), at trial in this matter.").
162. The experts are employees of the settling defendant's counsel. As such, their
work may be protected by the attorney work product doctrine, to the extent it is not
discoverable pursuant to the Rules of Civil Procedure. If the expert's opinions are not
protected by the attorney work product doctrine, the remaining defendant may subpoena the expert provided that the remaining defendant is willing to pay the expert's
regular fees. If the expert is an "in-house" expert-someone whom the settling defendant itself employs-that witness may possibly be classified as a fact witness and then
subpoenaed as would be any other fact witness.
163. For example, a product manufacturer will not want to allow plaintiff's counsel
access to its experts since counsel may later represent another plaintiff with similar
claims against this same defendant.
164. Does this matter? Who cares if the plaintiff is unable to rebut testimony about
the settling defendant's fault? Shouldn't the plaintiff have factored that into the settlement? Perhaps, but remember that the argument for fairness of Pierringerreleases turns
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Absence of the settling defendant's experts may present a parallel problem for the remaining defendants. It is possible that
the settling defendant developed the best expert testimony
about the plaintiff's fault. What happens to that testimony?
Once again, the expert's work may be inaccessible because it is
protected by the attorney work product doctrine. If the expert
has been deposed, the remaining defendant can introduce the
deposition. 165 If not, the remaining defendant can attempt to
negotiate an agreement with the settling defendant permitting
the expert to be called at trial. 166 Absent this kind of an agreement or a deposition, the jury will never hear the testimony of
the settling defendant's expert.
w.

Impact of the Loss of Evidence

As Justice Simonett wrote, "The Pierringer release may place

the nonsettling tortfeasor at a tactical disadvantage."167 In fact,
Pierringer releases routinely create tactical disadvantages. Mter
the release, the normal avenues for proof of the settling defendon an assumption that the remaining defendants will pay neither more nor less than
their fair share of fault. If that is to happen, the jury needs to hear evidence of the
settling defendant's fault (otherwise the remaining defendants will pay more than their
fair share) and evidence rebutting the settling defendant's fault (otherwise the remaining defendants will pay less than their fair share). One side of the story is not enough.
Fairness demands that the jury hear both.
165. The settling defendant may have fewer strategic objections to permitting a codefendant access to an expert opining on the plaintiff's contributory fault. The defendants' interests in proving the plaintiff's fault are aligned prior to a Pierringer settlement.
Unlike a Mary Carleragreement, the Pierringersettlement will not realign those interests.
166. Should a plaintiff be able to use a Pierringer settlement to prevent a settling
defendant's expert from testifying at trial? Suppose that a plaintiff and a defendant
include a provision in their Pierringer settlement requiring the settling defendant to
assert the work product doctrine to protect the expert's testimony. Suppose that the
plaintiff agrees to assume responsibility for the expert's fees-essentially buying the
benefits of the protecting doctrine from the settling defendant. Whether these types of
provisions should be enforced ought to depend, at least in part, on when the settlement
is negotiated. If the remaining defe·ndant has notice of the settlement before the close
of discovery, that defendant has a fair opportunity to develop its own expert testimony
about a plaintiff's contributory fault. On the other hand, suppose that the settlement
occurs during trial, the evening before the remaining defendants expect the settling
defendant's expert will testifY. The plaintiff and the settling defendant report to the
trialjudge and the remaining parties that the Pierringeragreement has been signed, and
that the expert witness-now in the employ of the plaintiff-is on his way to the airport.
The trial judge has a number of options: declare a mistrial; grant a continuance; go
forward with trial as if nothing has happened; or recall the expert for deposition or trial
testimony. Of all the options, the last is best. Plaintiffs and defendants ought not be
able to collude to hide witnesses.
167. Simonett, supra note 6, at 21.
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ant's fault are too often closed. Because of this, juror's inay not
hear the best-or any-evidence of a settling defendant's fault.
Justice Simonett concluded that the tactical disadvantages Pierringer releases create do "not taint the release's validity."168 Unfortunately, however, this is not always true. When evidence of a
settling defendant's fault fails to reach the jury, the jury may well
underestimate the settling defendant's share of fault. Some of
that fault will be reallocated to the remaining defendant and
that remaining defendant can no longer be assured that it will
pay no more than its fair share of fault. The Pierringer promise
has then been broken.

3.

Problems during Discovery

The impact that Pierringer releases have on the litigation process ripples out from trial. A Pierringer settlement may also have
a profound effect on discovery. The possibility of a Pierringer settlement will cause cautious defendants to change their discovery
strategy. Once settlement is a reality, a Pierringer settlement
changes the way that defendants can conduct discovery.

a.

The Means of Discovery

Having signed a Pierringer settlement, a settling defendant may
be dismissed from the litigation. 169 A party has to respond to
interrogatories, requests for production of documents, and requests for admissions;17o a nonparty does not. Once a settling
defendant is dismissed from the litigation, it is no longer compelled to respond to these discovery requests. 171
A settling defendant, however, cannot escape discovery altogether. The remaining parties can still obtain information from
the settling defendant through depositions and subpoena duces
168. [d.
169. See, e.g., Frey v. Snelgrove, 269 N.W.2d 918, 922 (Minn. 1978).
170. See, e.g., MINN. R CIY. P. 33-34 & 36.
171. Fietzer v. Ford Motor Co., 383 F. Supp. 33,36 (E.D. Wis. 1974). Plaintiff Fietzer
was injured in an auto accident, entered a Pierringer settlement with the driver of the
other car, and then sued Ford. Ford filed a third-party complaint against the settling
driver, who pleaded the release as a defense. Over Ford's objections, the trial judge
dismissed the settling driver from the suit. [d. at 34.
If the third-party defendants remain as parties to the suit, they will be subject
to the more liberal discovery proceedings of a party defendant, and, thus, if
they are dismissed, Ford contends it will have lost such discovery advantages.
While Ford's claim of prejudice may have arguable substance, the fact remains
that the third-party defendants "have bought their peace in any event."
[d. at 36.
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tecum. 172 However effective they may be, depositions are a more
narrowly focused mode of discovery. A remaining party may
have to conduct several depositions to obtain the same breadth
of information discoverable through a document production or
a set of interrogatories. Pierringer settlements make discovery
from a settling defendant more costly and more cumbersome. 173
b.

The Ends of Discovery

Pierringer releases may have yet another effect on discovery
that is more troubling and more nebulous. The possibility of
piecemeal settlement creates the need for piecemeal discovery.
In other words, cautious defendants must recognize and prepare
for the possibility that a co-defendant may settle prior to trial.
Settlement means that the remaining defendants will inherit the
burden, which was previously the plaintiff's, of proving the settling defendant's fault. As such, a defendant must anticipate the
necessity and conduct the discovery accordingly to prove this
fault. Since any of the co-defendants may settle before trial, the
cautious defendant will have to build a case against all other codefendants as well as the plaintiff.
Building a case against all other defendants means discovery
will be longer and more expensive. It means attorneys will take
more time crafting theories of co-defendant liability and strategies to prove those theories at trial. It means hiring more experts. Since every other defendant in the lawsuit will be just as
cautious, it also means an enormous duplication of effort, time,
and money.
The looming possibility of a Pierringer settlement does more,
however, than multiply the costs of discovery. It also divides the
defendants. Pierringer settlements make it more difficult for de172. See, e.g., MINN. R CIV. P. 30 & 45.04.
173. See Hefley v. Textron, Inc., 713 F.2d 1487, 1497 (10th Cir. 1983). Hefley involved potential defendants who were not parties to the suit because of a claim of immunity, rather than from a Pierringer settlement. The defendant argued it was
prejudiced because two other potential defendants were not subject to broader party
discovery. The court noted that discovery from non parties is often more expensive and
inconvenient. [d. The court refused to permit broader discovery from the immune
defendants. "A great number of factors, many of them regrettably unrelated to concepts of justice and fairness, influence the assessment of comparative fault. We are not
convinced that the more generous discovery allowed from parties inevitably would result in more favorable assessment." [d. at 1497 n.2. The court's reasoning is baftling;
the court seems to suggest that unfairness in some parts of the tort recovery system may
be overlooked simply because other parts of the system are also unfair.
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fendants to follow any kind of unified defense strategy.174 Our
hypothetical provides an example of this result. In the hypothetical, the bowling alley and the ball-return manufacturer each
face the very real possibility that they may be responsible for
proof of the other's fault at trial. Any spirit of cooperation between the defendants may melt away in the face of this possibility. For example, it is difficult to cooperate with a co-defendant
when that co-defendant is asking questions at depositions that
seem to help the plaintiff. It will also be difficult to cooperate
with that defendant when planning discovery strategies, and to
cooperate with that defendant during settlement negotiations.
In a sense, Pierringer releases have facilitated piecemeal settlements at the expense of universal settlements.
4.

Problems Affecting Settlement

Smart lawyers realize that Pierringer settlements create tactical
advantages and disadvantages for the remaining parties. Lawyers negotiate Pierringer settlements with these considerations in
mind. Sometimes, in fact, these tactical advantages and disadvantages may have more impact on the price paid for settlement
than on the merits of the claim.175
Pierringer releases also turn the intuitive logic of settlement on
its head. Intuition suggests that the more likely it is that a defendant will be liable for a large share of fault, the greater that
defendant's incentive to settle will be. Intuition also suggests
that the greater the evidence of a defendant's fault, the greater
that defendant's incentive to settle will be. These defendants
may have a strong incentive to settle, but a plaintiff would have
little incentive to oblige them. When a plaintiff negotiates a Pier174. Comparative fault also creates some of this difficulty, since it creates an incentive for defendants to place fault on one another. The Pierringer settlement heightens
the problem, however, because following a Pierringer settlement a defendant may have
both the incentive and the sole responsibility for proving a settling co-defendant's fault.
175. See, e.g., Robert J. Hauer, Jr., Pierringer Releases, DRAFfING SE'ITLEMENT AND RELEASE DOCUMENTS: STRATEGIES AND TECHNIQUES (MINN. CLE NOTEBOOK) (1989). Mr.
Hauer posits a hypothetical situation in which plaintiff passenger "A" suffers $35,000 of
damages while riding with an uninsured motorist. "If you are the attorney representing
A, your best scenario is to settle A's claim for substantially more than $35,000.00." Id. at
4. Mr. Hauer then explains how the intersection of law governing Pierringer releases
and uninsured motorist claims may make this possible. Id. See also John E. Simonett
(currently Justice Simonett), Indemnity, Contribution and Limited Releases, PRODUCTS LIABILrIY: BEYOND THE BASICS (MINN. CLE NOTEBOOK) 1 (1979) ("The Pierringer release is
useful in putting the insurer of the nonsettling defendant in a position to settle or risk a
bad faith excess claim.").
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ringer settlement with one defendant, the plaintiff hopes that the
remaining defendants will find little or no evidence of that settling defendant's fault and the jury will apportion little or no
fault to that settling defendant. 176 In other words, plaintiffs want
to settle with defendants in a fashion that will create the greatest
possible tactical disadvantage for the remaining defendants.
The impact that a Pierringer settlement has on proof at trial is a
boon to savvy plaintiffs and a snare for the unwary,I77
Is this really a cause for concern or simply the inevitable reality
of litigation? After all, it is hardly shocking that settlement involves more than just the merits of the claim. The"impact that a
Pierringer release has on trial, discovery, and settlement is cause
for concern, however, for at least two reasons. First, as argued in
Part IV of this article, our concern may produce tangible benefits. There are realistic solutions to many of the problems that
Pierringer releases can create. Second, our concern is warranted
because Pierringer releases were supposed to avoid exactly this
type of problem. Courts and commentators lauded the Pierringer
release because it permitted piecemeal settlement without the
drawbacks of the Mary Carter agreement. Unfortunately, like a
Mary Carter agreement, the Pierringer release can also distort trial,
discovery, and settlement.
IV.

ANn You MAy AsK YOURSELF "WELL, How
DID I GET HERE?"

Appellate courts have made a promise to nonsettling defendants that, following a Pierringer settlement, they will pay neither
more nor less than their fair share of fault. 178 If this promise is
being broken, why are the appellate courts silent? There are two
easy explanations. First, perhaps the problems Pierringer releases
may create at trial have not come to the attention of the appel176. "Ordinarily, unless the sum paid for the Pierringer is large, plaintiff will be inclined to settle only with what appear to be peripheral defendants and keep his cause of
action against a target defendant." Simonett, supra note 6, at 34.
177. The unwary plaintiff may settle with a defendant and then learn at trial that it
has lost access to rebuttal evidence necessary to exonerate the settling defendant. With
a wealth of accessible discovery available to establish the settling defendant's fault-and
none available to rebut-the remaining defendants may be able to convince the jury to
allocate an unfairly large percentage of liability to the settling defendant. In this situation, the Pierringer promise is broken to the detriment of the plaintiff: the share of fault
allocated to the remaining defendants will be smaller than it would have been absent a
settlement.
178. See part III.A.!.
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late bench. Second, it may be that appellate courts do not feel
the broken promise is sufficiently serious to warrant correction.
Ultimately, neither of these easy explanations seem correct.

A.

"We Had No Idea": Perhaps the Problems are Hidden

New laws, whether created by the legislature or the judiciary,
are easier to conceive than to implement. Once enacted and
applied, new laws are bound to spawn unexpected problems.
Why should the law creating Pierringer releases be any different?
Perhaps the problems Pierringer releases pose are especially difficult to predict. Perhaps the appellate courts were simply unable
to foresee the practical difficulties of implementing this new
form of release. This explanation tempts, but ultimately it does
not persuade.
The Minnesota Supreme Court gave official approval to Pierringer releases in Frey v. Snelgrove,I79 but these releases were
hardly new to Minnesota. There is ample evidence that by the
time Frey was decided in 1978, Pierringer releases had been in
common use in Minnesota for some time. There is also ample
evidence that in 1978 the problems that Pierringers could create
at trial were not only known to the bar, but also known to the
Frey court itself.

1.

Appellate Familiarity with Pierringer Releases: Minnesota
Law Before Frey v. Snelgrove

In 1974, four and one-half years before Frey, the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals applied Minnesota law in Riske v. Truck Insurance Exchange. I8o The Riske court upheld an insured's claim of
bad faith failure to settle against its insurance carrier. I81 The
insurer argued that it could not accept the proffered settlement
because Minnesota law permitted contribution between joint
tortfeasors, and a covenant not to sue would have exposed its
policyholder to later claims by the co-defendant. I82 The Eighth
Circuit rejected this argument:
179. 269 N.W.2d 918, 923 (Minn. 1978).
180. 490 F.2d 1079, 1082 (8th Cir. 1974).
181. Riske, 490 F.2d at 1086.
182. [d. at 1087. The plaintiffs in Riske were the owner and operator of a snowmobile. An exchange student from Hong Kong, Cynthia Ngan, was injured while riding
the snowmobile, and subsequently brought suit against the Riskes and the snowmobile
manufacturer. During trial, Ms. Ngan's attorney made a settlement proposal, and offered to give the Riskes a covenant not to sue if the settlement was accepted. The

HeinOnline -- 20 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 57 1994

58

WILliAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 20

[I] t appears that a proper type of release could have been
worked out. In fact, during the trial of this case [insurer's]
counsel indicated that a proper type of release was known as a
"Pieninger type release." Therefore, when [the insurer] failed
to apprise the [policyholder] of the offer, it was impossible for
them to consult their private attorney in order that he might
suggest the proper form of release. 183

The Eighth Circuit did not explain how the policyholder's private attorney would be able to opine that a Pierringer release was
a "proper form of release" without some authority in the jurisdiction permitting use of Pierringers. Nevertheless, Riske demonstrates that Pieninger releases were at least known and used in
Minnesota as early as 1970, the date of trial in Riske. 184
The Frey decision also indicates that the courts were aware that
Pierringer releases were already used in Minnesota before the decision in that case. According to the supreme court in Frey:
"The use of a so-called Pierringer release is in accord with Minnesota practice and our law of comparative negligence in tort actions. The bar and trial bench of this state have recently been
following the procedures set forth in Pierringer v. Hoger."185 Even
more striking is the fact that none of the parties in Frey-the
insurer did not tell the Riskes about the settlement offer, claiming that no available
form of release would have protected its policy-holder. The insurer also argued that it
would have been unethical to accept the settlement offer because it was contingent
upon the jury not being told of the settlement. [d. The Eighth Circuit held that the
insurer's failure to communicate the offer was nonetheless bad faith, because that failure foreclosed the Riskes "from demanding that [the insurer] secure a ruling from the
trial judge as to the propriety of such an agreement." [d. The need for this contingency illustrates one of the principal difficulties Pierringer releases were meant to
eliminate.
183. [d.
184. Riske is not the only case predating Frey v. Snelgrove in which a court mentions
that a Minnesota party may settle with one of several joint tortfeasors by means of a
Pierringer release. The Minnesota Supreme Court in Nebben v. Kosmalski, 307 Minn.
211,213 n.l, 239 N.W.2d 234, 236 n.l (1976), notes that the plaintiff settled with one of
the defendants using a Pierringer release without offering an opinion about the propriety of Pierringer releases. The settling defendant's insurer paid the money remaining on
the liability policy. A portion of the remaining insurance proceeds were paid to another claimant apparently in consideration of a dismissal with prejudice of that claimant's suit. The remaining insurance proceeds were held by the court until after trial of
the plaintiff's lawsuit, and then were paid out to the plaintiff apparently pursuant to a
Pierringer release. Interestingly, the Nebben jury found that neither the settling defendant nor the nonsettling defendant were negligent. [d. at 215, 239 N.W.2d at 237.
185. Frey, 269 N.W.2d at 921 (citation omitted). See also Simonett, supra note 6, at 3.
"In recent years, however, the Minnesota trial bar has been using with increasing frequency a simple and ingenious device called the Pierringer release." [d. The Simonett
article appeared in 1977.
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plaintiff, the settling defendants, the nonsettling defendantfelt it was necessary to raise any question about the permissibility
of Pierringerreleases! To be sure, the plaintiff mentioned in passing that "whether or not Pierringer v. Hogar [sic] ... will be followed in this state remains an open question."186 The
nonsettling defendant's response to this opening demonstrates
how widespread the acceptance of Pierringer releases must have
been at the time:
Even if one could seriously maintain that this Courl will not be receptive to a Pierringer release, it does not follow that doubts as to
the enforceability of such agreements entitle a settling defendant to remain a party to an action in the face of a motion
for dismissal by the non-settling defendant. I87
Simply put, by the time the Minnesota Supreme Court considered the issue, Pierringer releases were apparently so widely used
in Minnesota that it was impossible for lawyers in the state to
"seriously maintain" that the court would not approve their use.

2.

Appellate Familiarity with the Broken Promise: Appeal of
. Pierringer-created Problems During Trial

Frey also introduced Minnesota appellate courts to the
problems Pierringer releases can create at trial. The issue on appeal in that landmark case was not the validity of Pierringer releases, but the conduct of trial following a Pierringer settlement.
The Pierringer settlement in Frey occurred during trial. Rather
than dismissing the settling defendants from the case, the judge
permitted them to remain at trial. The lawyer for the settling
186. Brief for Plaintiff-Respondent at 11, Frey v. Snelgrove, 269 N.W.2d 918 (Minn.
1978) (No. 47620). Plaintiff mentioned the fact that the question is undecided, but did
not raise-much less brief-the issue for the court's consideration.
187. Reply Brief of Appellant Firestone at 8, Frey (No. 47620) (citation omitted, emphasis added). In hindsight, the nonsetding defendant's decision not to challenge the
permissibility of Pierringer releases was certainly reasonable. The decision not to challenge the validity of Pierringer releases may have had much to do with the Minnesota
Supreme Court's then recent decision in Pacific Indemnity Co. v. Thompson-Yaeger,
Inc., 260 N.W.2d 548 (Minn. 1977). In that case, the court cites an earlier Minnesota
case, Gronquist v. Olson, 242 Minn. 119,64 N.W.2d 159 (1954), to support the proposition that setdement agreements discharge all parties only if the parties intend the setdement payment to be full compensation for the plaintiffs injuries; if there is only partial
compensation, the plaintiff may pursue the nonsetding joint tortfeasors. Pacific Indem.,
260 N.W.2d at 558. That language seems to suggest that the court's approval of Pierringer releases was very nearly a foregone conclusion. On the other hand, neither the
parties nor the court in Frey make reference to this language or the Cronquist case in any
discussion of Pierringer releases.
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defendants cross-examined witnesses and delivered a closing argument following settlement. On appeal, nonsettling defendant
Firestone argued unsuccessfully that the trial court's failure to
dismiss the settling defendants deprived Firestone of a fair
trial. 188
In addition to its contention that the settling defendants
should have been dismissed from the case, Firestone presented
the Frey court with a litany of complaints about the conduct of
the trial following settlement. 189 Firestone's appeal raised many
of the fundamental questions about the influence Pierringer releases can have on trial and fault allocation:
1. Firestone complained that evidence of the settling defendant's fault was presented unfairly.19o According to
Firestone, the plaintiff attempted to rebut evidence of the
settling defendant's fault. 191 While denying this was a
188. On appeal, the supreme court suggested that in future cases "the trial court
should ordinarily dismiss the settling defendant from tlIe case" following a Pierringer
settlement. Frey, 269 N.W.2d at 923. The requirement is not absolute. "A trial court's
deviation would not constitute error if those modifications substantially protect the
rights of all parties and preseIVe the adversary process." [d. With respect to Firestone's
claim, tlIe court stated, "We have examined the record and find no prejudicial error to
defendant Firestone." [d. at 922. The court had already ruled, however, that under the
facts of the case before it, Firestone was precluded from claiming the settling defendants should have been dismissed because Firestone refused to dismiss its own crossclaims with prejudice. [d. at 921.
189. Throughout its brief, Firestone attempted to characterize tlIe settlement in Frey
as a Mary Carter agreement rather than a Pierringerrelease. Brief of Appellant Firestone,
Frey v. Snelgrove, 269 N.W.2d 918 (Minn. 1978) (No. 47620). For example, Firestone
stated:
Mary Carter agreements were defined ... as "basically a contract by which one
co-defendant secretly agrees with the plaintiff that, if such defendant will proceed to defend himself in court, his own liability will be diminished proportionately by increasing the liability of the other co-defendants." Ward v. Ochoa,
284 So. 2d 385, 387 (Fla. 1973) .... [A] Mary Carter agreement usually has the
added elements of secrecy from the jury and continued participation of the
settling defendant.
[d. at 20-21. Though not adopted by tlIe supreme court, this characterization was not
altogether unreasonable. The agreement in Frey provided tlIat any recovery from remaining defendant Firestone, up to the amount of tlIe settlement, would be credited to
the settling defendants. [d. at 6-7.
190. The plaintiff actually reached a settlement with two defendants. One was the
owner of the car involved in the accident, and the other was the driver of the car. At
the close of evidence, the trial judge granted the defendant owner's motion for a directed verdict, and the issue of this defendant's negligence was not submitted to tlIe
jury. Firestone included this ruling in its bill of errors for its motion for new trial, but
did not appeal this issue. Appendix to Brief of Appellant Firestone at A-57, Frey (No.
47620).
191. Prior to the settlement, the plaintiff had introduced evidence that the settling
defendant was driving faster than the speed limit. Mter the settlement, Firestone com-
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problem at trial in Frey, plaintiff did admit "when a settlement is made, it is true that there may be some motive on
the part of the parties to slant their testimony-especially
where the joint conduct of the settling party and the nonsettling defendant combine to cause the accident.,,192
2. The plaintiff in Frey also mentioned additional problems
of proof that could arise following a Pierringer settlement.
If a settling defendant is dismissed, plaintiff argued, "the
disappearance . . . affords the remaining defendant a
much clearer field to heap the blame on the now-absent
party."193
3. Firestone argued that the settlement unfairly shifted the
focus of the trial to Firestone's liability. Following settlement, Firestone became the "target" defendant. Firestone complained that the settling parties set them up.
During closing argument, plaintiffs counsel argued that
the defective tire had caused the accident and gave, in
Firestone's words, "a purportedly frank appraisal of a lack
of responsibility on the part of . . . [the settling
defendants] .194
4. Firestone complained that the parties to the settlement
kept the agreement secret from the court and Firestone,
hampering Firestone's ability to modifY its trial strategy.
According to Firestone, "The settlement was no doubt
verbally entered before ... plaintiffs had introduced a
substantial portion of their testimony regarding damages
and before Firestone or the settling defendants even began presenting their evidence."195

Firestone raised concerns about the fairness of Pierringer releases
in three areas: problems of proof, problems of strategy, and
problems of settlement. Firestone complained in its brief that
the Pierringer settlement created problems that deprived Fireplained, the plaintiff challenged testimony suggesting that the settling defendant was
speeding at the time of the accident. Brief of Appellant Firestone at 46, Frey (No.
47620).
192. Brief of Plaintiff-Respondent at 19, Frey (No. 47620).
193. [d. at 18.
194. Brief of Appellant Firestone at 48, Frey v. Snelgrove, 269 N.W.2d 918 (Minn.
1978) (No. 47620). This seems a little disingenuous, doesn't it? Certainly Firestone
must have understood that the plaintiff would focus on the liability of the large, out-ofstate, corporate manufacturer that did not settle. The point here, however, is not that
Firestone could have anticipated that its liability would become the principal focus of
trial; the point is that a Pierringer settlement will inevitably cause some shift of focus, and
Firestone raised this issue on appeal.
195. Reply Brief of Appellant Firestone at 12-13, Frey (No. 47620).
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stone of a fair trial. 196 The Minnesota Supreme Court responded by approving the use of Pierringer releases in the state,
but provided only minimal guidance to trial judges concerned
with the conduct of trial following a Pierringer settlement. 197

B.

"It's Not a Problem": Perhaps the Promise is Not Broken

Appellate courts in Minnesota, Wisconsin, and North Dakota
have been largely silent about Pierringer-created problems at trial
and during discovery. Is it possible that the problems simply
aren't very serious? Again, this is an explanation that, although
tempting, is ultimately unpersuasive. Though Pierringer releases
are most prevalent in Minnesota, Wisconsin, and North Dakota,
they are also used in other jurisdictions. 198 Confronted with Pierringer-created problems of proof and unfairness to the remaining
parties at trial, appellate courts in one of those other jurisdictions decided to sharply curtail the use of Pierringer releases.
Maine first formally approved the limited use of Pierringer releases in 1984. 199 Since that time, however, the Maine Supreme
196. Brief of Appellant Firestone at 8-9, Frey (No. 47620). The Frey court declined to
reach this issue, ruling: "Under the facts of this case, Firestone is precluded from now
claiming that the trial court should have dismissed all cross<laims and removed the
settling defendants from the lawsuit." Frey, 269 N.W.2d at 921. Firestone did not appeal
the jury's finding that the tire was defective, nor did Firestone contest the amount of
damages the jury awarded. Brief of Appellant Firestone at 46 n.4, Frey (No. 47620).
Firestone's complaint on appeal was with the jury's allocation of fault. The jury allocated 80% of fault for the accident to Firestone and 20% to the settling defendant
driver. Plaintiff's counsel argued in closing that the jury should allocate 35% of fault to
the settling defendant driver. The plaintiff suggested this was evidence of the fairness
of the trial; Firestone pointed to this as further evidence of the unfairness of the trial.
Brief of Plaintiff-Respondent at 16; Reply Brief of Appellant Firestone at 15.
197. The guidance provided may be minimal, but it is still the most complete appellate statement about the conduct of trial following a Pieninger release. The absence of
additional guidance on conduct of litigation following a Pieninger settlement is not so
much the fault of the Frey decision, but the failure of later appellate courts to complete
the framework in Frey. Appellate courts in Wisconsin and North Dakota have also
turned away from Pienin~reated problems, offering little or no guidance to the trial
court about solution of those problems. See, e.g., Bartels v. City of Williston, 276 N.W.2d
113, 121 (N.D. 1979); Johnson v. Heintz, 243 N.W.2d 815, 823 (Wis. 1976). See also
Barlage v. The Place, Inc., 277 N.W.2d 193 (Minn. 1979), in which the court paid only
scant attention to similar issues concerning the impact of a loan-receipt agreement on
trial. The appellant's brief, however, offered considerable criticism of the effect of the
settlement agreement on trial. See Brief of Appellant Firestone at 4-11, Frey (No.
47620).
198. See, e.g., Quick v. Crane, 727 P.2d 1187 (Idaho 1986); Gaulden v. Burlington
No. Inc., 654 P.2d 383 (Kan. 1982).
199. Thurston v. 3K Kamper Ko., Inc., 482 A2d 837 (Me. 1984). Admittedly,
Maine's approval of Pieninger releases was limited to a narrow set of circumstances.
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Court has drastically narrowed the use of Pierringer releases.
Maine's rationale for retrenchment has been a concern that Pierringer releases create unfairness for the parties remaining at
trial. 200
In Lavoie v. Celotex Corp.,201 the Maine court held that a defendant settling pursuant to a Pierringer agreement should not be
dismissed from the lawsuit if the nonsettling defendant brought
a cross-claim against the settling defendant and objected to the
dismissal. 202 The court in Lavoie was concerned that dismissal
would create problems of proof at trial: "We cannot agree that
the settlement arrangement has no practical effect on the nonsettling defendant. The practical effect of a non-settling defendant arguing the question of liability in the absence of the settling
defendant is dependent on the circumstances in each case, and
cannot be determined in the abstract."203
Maine subsequently reaffirmed that its statutes usually require
a verdict be reduced by the dollar amount of any Pierringer settlement. In two separate cases, Maine's supreme court ruled that
the amount of the Pierringer settlement must be subtracted from
the verdict if the jury apportioned any fault to the settling defendant or if the trial judge dismissed the settling defendant and
its fault was not submitted to the jury.204 Each of these decisions
Maine statutory law provides that a plaintiffs verdict should be reduced by the amount
of any prior settlement with "persons causing the injury." ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14,
§ 163 (1980). Since the jury did not apportion any fault to the settling defendant in
Thurston, the court reasoned that the settling defendant was not a person "causing the
injury," and declined to reduce the verdict by the amount of the settlement. Thurston,
482 A.2d at 842.
200. For a post-Thurston critique of the need for Pierringer releases in Maine, see
John W. Bernotavicz, The Pierringer Question, BAR BULL. (Me. State Bar Ass'n) ,July 1985,
at 157.
201. 505 A.2d 481 (Me. 1986).
202. [d. at 483.
203. [d. Lavoie effectively put an end to an innovative approach proffered by a federal judge. In Stacey v. Bangor Punta Corp., 108 F.R.D. 72 (D. Me. 1985), the trial
judge permitted the nonsettling defendant to choose whether or not to submit the fault
of the settling defendant to the jury for apportionment. [d. at 76. If the remaining
defendant chose to submit the fault, then the verdict would be reduced by the percentage share of fault. If the remaining defendant chose not to submit the fault, then the
verdict would be reduced by the dollar amount of the settlement. [d. The passing of
the Stacey approach is to be mourned, if only because it creates such interesting
problems of trial strategy.
204. See Hewitt v. Bahmueller, 584 A.2d 664,666 (Me. 1991); Clockedile v. Town of
Yarmouth, 520 A.2d 1075, 1077 (Me. 1987). In Hewitt, the nonsettling defendant's
cross claims against one of the settling defendants were dismissed, so the trial judge did
not submit that settling defendant's fault to the jury. Hewitt, 584 A.2d at 666. Nonethe-
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further reduced the incentive for parties to use Pierringer releases
when settling multi-party litigation.
Maine recently expanded a remaining defendant's right to object to dismissal of a settling defendant following a Pierringer
agreement. 205 The court in Petit v. Key Bancshares of Maine2 06
held that a trial judge "may not enter a Pierringer order extinguishing the contribution claims of a nonsettling defendant,
whether they are inchoate or asserted in a pending cross-claim,
over the objection of the nonsettling defendant."207 The Petit
decision effectively eliminates Pierringer releases in Maine and
leaves little doubt as to why Maine's supreme court decided to
write an end to their use of Pierringer releases in that jurisdiction.208 Reviewing the rationale of the Lavoie decision, the Petit
court wrote, "[W]e were mindful of the distortion of the adversarial relationships that invariably accompames Pierringer
releases. "209
Maine chose to eliminate Pierringer releases. Here in Minnesota and Wisconsin, at the wellspring of Pierringer releases, that
decision may seem like an overreaction. The fact remains, however, that the problems Pierringer releases can create during litigation and trial are serious enough to have convinced one
appellate court to effectively do away with Pierringer releases
altogether. 210
C.

Well Then, How Did We Get Here?

As reflected by its decisions, it is clear that Maine's supreme
court was deeply troubled by Pierringer-created problems of fairness. It is impossible to be certain why appellate courts have not
offered more guidance about proof of fault following settlement.
less, the amount of the plaintiff's settlement with that defendant was deducted from the
verdict. [d.
205. See Petit v. Key Bancshares of Me., Inc., 614 A.2d 946, 948 (Me. 1992).
206. [d.
207. [d.
208. Neither the plaintiff nor the settling defendant have any incentive to negotiate
a Pierringer agreement. The plaintiff's verdict will be reduced by the dollar amount of
the settlement (unless the jury considers the settling defendant's fault and apportions
zero percent to the settling defendant). The settling defendant will still be required to
attend trial.
209. Petit, 614 A.2d at 947.
210. [d. at 948. If Maine's decision seems like an overreaction, it is also worthwhile
to remember that the problems that prompted Maine to take this step are not so different from the problems that prompted other jurisdictions to ban Mary Carter agreements. See, e.g., Elbaor v; Smith, 845 S.W.2d 240,250 (Tex. 1992).
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In a dissenting opinion written in 1977, a Wisconsin Supreme
Court Justice complained:
... [T] here are difficulties in having the jury allocate fault to
persons who are not parties. . . . Writers in the field of comparative negligence have paid some attention to this problem
of proof of negligence of multi-tortfeasors some of whom are
not parties, but courts have been relatively silent. . .. I understand the majority's reluctance to deal with this issue, but we
must start establishing guidelines for the sake of the bench,
the bar and the public. 211

Nearly two decades later, it is harder to understand the continuing silence on this issue. Discussion of that silence is necessarily
speculative. It is speculation that is worthwhile, however, if it
helps build a fuller understanding of how problems in the law
can take root and spread.
1.

It's Just a Trial

Perhaps our appellate courts believe that problems of fairness
at trial are best left to trial judges. Appellate courts are traditionally reluctant to second-guess the trial process. In theory, our
system affords the trial judge enormous discretion over the trial
process. In a sense, appellate courts want no part in the actual
conduct of trial. 212 Given this division of labor, perhaps it makes
sense that appellate courts are silent on problems of proof at
trial. If Pierringer releases create problems at trial, shouldn't correction of those problems rest with the trial judges?
At times, however, it seems as if appellate courts are motivated
by more than simple deference to the trial bench. At times, appellate courts appear motivated by ~ desire to distance analysis of
the law from the trial process. We need look no further than
Pieninger v. Hoger 13 itself to find the seeds of this phenomenon:
The determination of this issue [liability] between the plaintiff
and the nonsettling defendant does not require the settling
211. Gross v. Midwest Speedways, Inc., 260 N.W.2d 36, 44 (Wis. 1977) (Abrahamson,
j., dissenting). Gross did not involve a Pierringer settlement, but Justice Abrahamson
raised this concern in the context of a discussion about the Pierringer case. Id. at 42.
212. For example, evidentiary rulings and jury instructions present likely opportunities for an error of law at trial. If no objection is made at the time of trial, however, an
erroneous evidentiary ruling or jury instruction will usually not be disturbed on appeal.
See, e.g., State v. McMorris, 373 N.W.2d 593, (Minn. 1985) (holding that failure to object to the trial court's handling ofajury request to review evidence results in forfeiture
of the right to appeal any error).
213. 124 N.W.2d 106, 112 (Wis. 1963).
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defendants to remain parties because the allocation, if any, of
the causal negligence to the settling tort-feasors is merely a
part of the mechanics by which the percentage of causal negligence of the nonsettling tort-feasor is determined. 214
Those mere "mechanics" are known by another name-trial and
litigation. The work that lawyers, judges, and jurors must do to
allocate comparative fault both before and during trial is anything but "mere mechanics." Implementation of the law is more
than a simple, mechanical process. Like it or not, trial, with all
of its uncertainties and vagaries, is as much a part of our tort
system as the comparative fault statute. 215

2.

Unfairness Works

There may be another, more troubling explanation for the appellate silence on this issue. The unfairness of a Pierringer settlement serves the system well. Following a Pierringer settlement,
particularly at or near trial, the remaining parties may find it
very difficult to either prove or rebut the fault of the settling
party.216 Left uncorrected, these difficulties may create an overwhelming incentive for the remaining party suffering the tactical
disadvantage to agree to settlement. 217 In short, Pierringer releases not only make piecemeal settlement easy, they also make
214. Id.
215. For another illustration of this phenomenon, see Hefley v. Textron, Inc., 713
F.2d 1487 (10th Cir. 1983). That case raised questions about problems of proof and
discovery that were essentially identical to Piminpcreated problems, though the defendant was missing from the case due to immunity rather than settlement. Private
Tommy Hefley was injured in a helicopter crash and he sued Textron, the manufacturer of the helicopter. Textron, in tum, filed a third-party complaint against the
United States, among others. The circuit court held that the United States was immune
from suit, but agreed that its fault should be submitted to the jury anyway, so that remaining defendant Textron would be liable only for its own share of fault. So far, so
good. Textron also requested that the United States not be dismissed as a party so that
Textron could serve document requests and interrogatories on the government in order to establish that fault. The circuit court balked:
[T]o any extent that inclusion of the United States as a party would allow more
extensive discovery, which presumably would provide evidence that would persuade the jury to assign a lesser degree of fault to Textron, we conclude that
the effect on the outcome of the case is trivial. In no event will Textron be
liable for more than its proportionate share of fault.
Id. at 1497. The holding here is astonishing, and is tantamount to saying simply "since
the remaining defendant will pay what it will pay, the result must be fair." Appellate
courts should not ignore the fact that the process of trial plays a part in determining the
outcome of a case.
216. See generaUy discussion in part II.B. supra.
217. If the fault of the settling defendant will be difficult to prove, then the remaining defendant is the party at a tactical disadvantage. If, on the other hand, the fault of
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the trial after the settlement very difficult indeed. If trial
promises to be difficult, the remaining parties will also likely settle. In a system that favors settlement, this incentive is seen as a
blessing. As one trial judge stated: "The policy of encouraging
settlement outweighs the prejudice, if any, which the dismissal of
the settling tort-feasor may occasion to the remaining parties."218
This concept undermines our notion of judicial process. It is
simply unjust to permit unfairness to serve as the driving engine
of settlement. If nothing else, this concept wholly betrays the
Picrringer promise. Moreover, as argued in the next section, it is
possible to take simple steps to correct some of the problems
associated with trial following a Picrringersettlement and still preserve incentives for remaining parties to settle.
V.

INTO THE BLUE AGAIN,

Now

THAT THE MONEY'S GoNE

What then is to be done? It can be argued that Picrringer releases do not work, but it cannot be denied that they work better
than Mary Carter releases or covenants not to sue. Absent fundamental revisions in tort law, we seem to be stuck with Picrringer
releases. Is there some way to fix Picrringer settlements so that
they no longer undermine the fairness of the litigation and trial
that may follow settlement?
A better solution may be to attempt to fix the litigation and
trial after the Picrringer settlement. In essence, we need to
reshape postsettlement litigation in a way that protects the nonsettling parties' access to information without jeopardizing the
settling defendant's need for repose. To strike this balance, we
will need the help of the trial bench. In cases involving a Pierringer settlement, judges will have to oversee discovery and trial
to ensure that the jury has a reasonable basis for the apportionment of fault to the settling defendant. This means making minor changes in the role of the judge, as well as more significant
changes in the settling defendants' use of discovery, the use of
expert witnesses, and the conduct of trial.
the settling defendant is difficult to rebut, then the plaintiff suffers the tactical disadvantage. Either way. the Pierringer promise is broken.
218. Fietzer v. Ford Motor Co .• 383 F. Supp. 33,36 (E.D. Wis. 1974). The court in
Johnson v. Heintz, 243 N.W.2d 815 (Wis. 1976). said much the same thing: "Unfortunate effects from a viewpoint of trial tactics mayor may not result to the nonsettling
codefendants. but these incidences do not constitute a legally cognizable bar to the
release, which is facilitating a policy of reducing litigation and stimulating accord.· [d.
at 823.
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Early Notice of Settlement

Without notice of settlement, the court and the remammg
parties will find it impossible to make the changes during litigation and trial necessary to enable the jury to fairly allocate the
fault. Delay in notice can substantially hamper the nonsettling
defendants' ability to conduct effective discovery and plan for
trial. Most jurisdictions require parties to a Pieninger settlement
to notify the court and other parties of the settlement; Minnesota requires the court and the other parties to "be immediately
notified."219 Trial judges need to clarify, however, what "immediate notice" means.
If the Pieninger settlement occurs during discovery, parties to
the settlement should be required to notify the court and other
parties of the settlement within a very short period of time, such
as three days.22o The remaining defendants need notice of settlement so they can adjust their litigation strategy. During trial,
however, a delay of three days or even one day may have a
profound impact since the nonparties may need to alter their
plans for examination of witnesses. Consequently, if the settlement occurs during trial, the settling parties should be required
to notify the court and other parties before the next witness testifies. Judges should articulate these standards in their standing
rules or in the discovery scheduling orders in each civil case.
Clarifying what is meant by "immediate notice" is not a complete solution. Trial judges need a means to enforce these rules.
Plaintiffs, in particular, have an incentive to delay notice of a
settlement since delay-particularly at trial-may create insoluble problems of proof for the remaining defendants. 221 More219. Frey v. Snelgrove, 269 N.W.2d 918, 923 (Minn. 1978).
220. Three days seems to be the shortest reasonable period for notification of settlement. Because a Pieninger settlement realigns litigation interests, all parties should ideally receive notice of settlement before any other significant development in the
litigation, such as the taking of additional discovery. For example, five days notice is
regarded as the minimal reasonable notice in most cases for taking depositions. See 2
DAVID F. HERR & ROGER S. HAYDOCK, MINNESOTA PRACTICE, CML RULES ANNOTATED
30.7 (2d ed. 1985). It makes sense to require a shorter period of notice for settlement
to forestall completion of discovery during the time between settlement and notice.
221. If a plaintiff hides the fact of settlement until after the close of discovery, it may
be too late for the remaining defendant to develop the evidence needed to prove the
fault of the settling party. If a plaintiff hides the fact of a settlement that has occurred
during trial, the remaining defendants may take a position at trial that would be inconsistent with proof of the settling defendant's fault. It is probably impossible to determine if a significant number of Pieningersettlements are hidden from the court and the
remaining parties until late in discovery or late in trial. In Frey, it appears that settle-
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over, as discussed below, trial judges can do much to reduce the
incentive to delay. Judges also need to create disincentives, or
sanctions, for delay.
At present, judges have at least two means in their power to
sanction parties who fail to report a settlement. First, judges
could refuse to dismiss the settling defendant from the suit if
notice of the settlement is delayed. 222 This would place the onus
of notification on the settling defendant. 223 Second, continuing
litigation against a party after settlement violates the rule of professional responsibility prohibiting a lawyer from asserting a frivolous claim.224 Conceivably, ajudge could report a lawyer to the
Board of Professional Responsibility if the lawyer failed to disclose a settlement.
B.

Changes in Postsettlement Discovery

Many Pierringersettlements occur during discovery, well before
tria1. 225 If settlement occurs during discovery, the trial court can
easily solve many of the distortions of litigation that the Pierringer
release might otherwise cause. First, the trial court needs to clarify burdens of proof following the settlement. Second, the trial
court needs to "capture" available evidence that is apt to evaporate following the Pierringer settlement. Steps to accomplish
ment was unreported for at least one full trial day. See Brief of Appellant at 6, Firestone,
Brief of Plaintiff-Respondent Frey at 4, and Brief of Respondents Snelgrove and Anderson at IS, Frey (No. 47620). The settlement was signed on Friday, October 31, 1975;
defendant Firestone received notice of the settlement on either Tuesday, November 4,
or Wednesday, November 5.
222. Frey, 269 N.W.2d at 923. Frey provides that, following a Pierringer settlement,
"[T]he trial court should ordinarily dismiss the settling defendant from the case." Id.
(emphasis added). If a settlement has been hidden from the remaining defendants,
requiring the settling defendant to remain a party at trial may be an effective way both
to punish the delay in notice and to cure Pierringer-<reated problems of trial distortion.
In this situation, the judge could give the jury notice of the settlement and the new
alignment of the party's interests.
223. Settling defendants can bear this burden lightly because they have no incentive
to hide settlement from the court.
224. The Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct provide that "[a] lawyer shall not
bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a
basis for doing so that is not frivolous .... " MINN. RVLES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDver
Rule 3.1. Additionally, if a trial judge has specifically inquired whether the plaintiff has
reached settlement, and the lawyers for the settling parties deny settling, then the lawyers have breached Rule 3.3 of the Professional Rules, which forbids a lawyer from
knowingly making a false statement of fact to a tribunal. Id. at 3.3(a) (1).
225. See supra note 150.
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these goals need to be taken before the settling defendant is dismissed from the lawsuit.
1.

Postsettlement Conference

Once parties give notice of the Pierringer settlement occurring
during discovery, the court should convene a discovery conference. 226 At this conference, the judge can review the pleadings
and release, and determine whether or not the settling defendant may be dismissed from the litigation. 227 In addition, the
judge should also determine what discovery has been completed,
focusing in particular on discovery by the settling defendant and
its experts. The judge should also signify that the remaining defendants will bear the burden of proving the settling defendant's
fault. 228
2.

Completing Discovery from Settling Defendants

At the postsettlement conference, the judge should determine
whether the plaintiff and remaining defendants have completed
their discovery against the settling defendant. If depositions
have been completed in the time between the settlement and
notice of the settlement, the judge should consider allowing the
remaining defendants to reopen those depositions. 229
226. Ajudge has the discretion to direct attorneys and parties to appear for a conference for "improving the quality of the trial through more thorough preparation," and
for "facilitating the settlement of the case." MINN. R. CIV. P. 16.01 (d), (e). Either purpose would appear to justify a post-Pierringer settlement conference.
227. In most cases, it is appropriate to dismiss the settling defendant. Frey suggests
that dismissal is appropriate unless "a nonsettling party has cross-claims for both contribution and indemnity, either of which is not covered by the terms of the release .... "
Frey, 269 N.W.2d at 923. Typically, a Pierringer release provides that the plaintiff indemnifies the settling defendant for all claims of indemnity or contribution asserted by the
remaining defendants. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. But see Alumax Mill
Prods., Inc. v. Congress Fin. Corp., 912 F.2d 996, 1008 (8th Cir. 1990). Dismissal may
be inappropriate if the defendants have cross-claims asserting independent causes of
action against each other. If the court believes that it makes sense to resolve these
issues during trial of the plaintiffs action, then the court should refuse to dismiss the
settling defendant. [d. at 1011.
228. This postsettlement conference should not involve any significant increase in
the trial judge's workload. At present, settling defendants need to bring a motion for
dismissal following a Pierringersettlement. Ajudge can conduct the postsettlement conference and, once notified that discovery from the settling defendant is complete, file
the order dismissing the settling defendant without an additional hearing.
229. Because the Pierringersettlement realigns parties' interests, fairness may require
reopening those depositions. Allowing the depositions to be reopened will also help
eliminate the incentive to delay notice. If there has been a significant delay in notice,
interrogatories or requests for production may have been completed in the interval
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If there are pending motions to compel discovery from the
settling defendant, the judge should decide those motions and
retain jurisdiction over the settling defendant until the settling
defendant has complied with the judge's order. If the defendant
resides outside the court's subpoena power, the judge should inquire whether or not the defendant and its fact witnesses have
agreed to be present for trial. If not, the judge should ensure
that testimony from these witnesses has been preserved for
trial. 230
If the plaintiff and remaining defendants have not completed
document and interrogatory discovery against the settling defendant and its fact witnesses, the judge should retain jurisdiction over the settling defendant. The judge can request a
motion for expedited discovery to accelerate the time needed to
complete interrogatory and document discovery.231 Once that
discovery is complete, the judge can dismiss the settling
defendant.
Refusing to dismiss a settling defendant until this discovery is
complete does diminish the value of settlement. This loss of
"settlement repose" is slight, however, particularly in light of the
fact that these changes would make information available to remaining parties which they could otherwise obtain only through
deposition.
3.

Completion of Expert Witness Discovery

When Pierringer settlements occur early in discovery, before
parties have designated the experts they will call at trial, there is
little the judge need do other than remind parties of the change
in burdens of proof wrought by the Pierringer release. The remaining parties are then free to hire experts as they see fit. Likewise, there is little a judge need do if the Pierringer settlement
occurs after all the designated experts have been deposed. For
better or worse, the remaining parties can rely on the deposition
transcripts at trial. 232
between settlement and notice. If so, the court may also want to consider permitting
additional interrogatories and document production as well.
230. The judge can either order a videotape deposition of the settling defendant or
retain jurisdiction over the defendant to mandate the defendant's presence at trial.
231. MINN. R. CN. P. 33.01 (b), 34.02. Since nonparties may be deposed, there is no
real need to retain jurisdiction over a settling defendant to facilitate depositions.
232. A remaining party may be able to make a compelling case that it needs a trial
deposition of one of the settling defendant's experts or of the plaintiff's expert on the

HeinOnline -- 20 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 71 1994

72

WlUJAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 20

Matters are more complicated when the Pierringer settlement
occurs after testifying experts have been designated and some or
all of those experts have yet to be deposed. If this is the case, the
trial judge needs to look carefully at which experts have been
deposed and which have not. Pierringer settlements can have a
profound impact on the availability of four categories of expert
witness testimony:
Category One: Experts the settling defendant hired to testify about the
liability of other defendants. A defendant manufacturer may, for
example, have hired an expert witness to testify about defects in
component parts made by another defendant. If the component
parts manufacturer is still a defendant, the plaintiff will want this
evidence in front of the jury. If the plaintiff has also settled with
the component parts manufacturer, the remaining defendants
will want this testimony in evidence.
Category Two: Experts the settling defendant hired to testify about the
plaintiffs fault. The remaining defendants will want this testimony in evidence.
Category Three: Experts the plaintiff hired to testify about the settling
defendant'S fault. Following settlement, the plaintiff will have little incentive to introduce this evidence, but the remaining defendants will want this evidence to go before the jury.
Category Four: Experts the settling defendant hired to rebut evidence of
its own fault. Plaintiffs will want to introduce this evidence to
minimize the liability of settling defendants.
Trial courts need to ensure that the jury has a reasonable basis
on which to assess the fault of a settling party, and at the same
time take care that no party be permitted to escape its burdens
of presentation and persuasion. When deciding what to do
about experts who have been designated to testify, have not been
deposed, and are likely to "evaporate" following a Pierringer settlement, a trial judge needs to answer two questions. First, do
the remaining parties have the ability to develop similar expert
testimony? Second, is it appropriate that they do so? The answers to these questions may depend on the category of the
expert.

settling defendant's fault. If the judge believes the discovery deposition of the expert is
inadequate to convey an expert's opinion to the jury, it would make sense to permit a
trial deposition of one or more experts prior to dismissal of the settling defendant.
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Categories One and Two: Experts on the Plaintiffs
Fault and the Remaining Defendants' Fault

A Pierringer release can realign interests at trial and shift burdens of proof, but it has no impact on the parties' incentives to
develop this type of expert testimony. A defendant has an incentive to develop expert testimony about the plaintiff's fault both
before and after a Pierringer settlement. If discovery is still open,
the remaining defendants have both the ability and the incentive
to develop their own expert testimony about the plaintiff's fault.
Likewise, the plaintiff can develop its own testimony about the
fault of the remaining defendants. Requiring these remaining
parties to develop this evidence is consistent with those parties'
burdens of presentation and persuasion.
If discovery is closed, then the judge has three options. First,
the judge could order that the settling defendant's experts be
deposed. Second, the judge could reopen discovery to permit
alternative experts to be hired. Third, the judge could order the
parties to proceed to trial without benefit of expert testimony on
these issues. Unless the remaining parties have some credible
explanation for their failure to develop this type of expert testimony, this last option is probably best. 233
b.

Category Three and Four Experts: Experts establishing or
rebutting .the settling defendant's fault

Because a Pierringer settlement will create a new set of incentives concerning proof of the settling defendant's fault, experts
on the settling defendant's fault present a different situation. It
makes sense to permit the deposition of these experts, regardless
of whether or not discovery is still open. For example, prior to a
Pierringer settlement, a plaintiff has no incentive to develop expert testimony exonerating the settling defendant. Likewise, a
nonsettling defendant may have had no reason to develop expert testimony about the settling defendant's fault. If expert testimony about the settling defendant's fault or lack of fault exists,
it makes sense to permit discovery of that testimony. Discovery
of the testimony will provide the jury with the evidence it needs
to make a reasoned allocation of fault to the settling defendant.
233. What would a credible excuse be? A remaining defendant might find itself
without an expert about a certain aspect of the plaintiff's fault because the defendants
had agreed that the settling defendant would develop expert testimony in this area.
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If the plaintiff has hired an expert who, for example, has issued a report opining that the settling defendant is at fault, it
seems appropriate to permit the remaining defendants to depose that expert. Alternatively, the plaintiff should be allowed to
depose the expert that the settling defendant hired to testify
about its own lack of fault.
C.

Settlement during or Shortly before Trial

When a Pierringer settlement occurs during or shortly before
trial, it may be more difficult for the judge to solve some of the
potential problems of unfairness. The Pierringer settlement creates the same potential problems of unfairness on the eve of trial
as it does during discovery. Proximity to trial, however, may
magnify the impact of those problems. The judge must still clarify the changed burdens of proof and capture evidence that is
likely to evaporate. Unfortunately, a settlement occurring near
trial limits both the time and the tools available to accomplish
these goals. 234

1.

Conference Concerning the Settlement

Once notified of the Pierringer settlement, the judge should
convene lawyers for all of the parties to discuss the settlement.
The judge could review the Pierringer agreement, and enter its
terms on the record. 235 As with a Pierringer settlement occurring
during discovery, the judge could then discuss with the parties
the realigned burdens of proof. The plaintiff and remaining defendants should disclose the witnesses that they plan to call to
prove and rebut the settling defendant's fault. The trial judge
could review this proposed evidence to determine whether steps
need to be taken to capture evidence that is in danger of "evaporating." Arrangements can be made at this conference concerning the testimony of the settling defendant. 236
234. When a Pieningersettlement occurs just before trial, there may be cases when it
makes sense to grant a continuance to reopen discovery-perhaps to give the remaining defendants an opportunity to depose critical experts who now will not be available
to testify. In most cases, if the Pieninger settlement is negotiated just before trial, it will
make sense to give the remaining parties at least a half-day to restructure their trial
strategy.
235. See, e.g., Frey v. Snelgrove, 269 N.W.2d 918,923 (Minn. 1978).
236. The settling defendant will presumably be present in court, and in any event,
has not yet been dismissed from the lawsuit. If necessary, the remaining party desiring
the settling defendant's testimony can serve a subpoena. If appearance later at trial will
work a substantial hardship on the settling defendant, the trial court may consider or-
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Preventing "Evaporation" of Evidence

When a Pierringer release is signed at or near trial, a judge will
have the opportunity to preserve the testimony of the settling
defendant through subpoena or deposition. The evidence most
in danger of "evaporating" after the Pieninger settlement is expert testimony.237 As is the case with Pieningersettlement during
discovery, there are four categories of expert evidence at issue.
It is important that the jury hear any existing testimony from
Category Three and Four experts-the experts establishing or
rebutting the settling defendant's fault. 238 The parties wishing
to proffer this testimony will not have had an incentive to develop this evidence themselves prior to the Pieninger release. For
that reason, the judge may need to take all reasonable steps to
capture existing testimony from the plaintiff's expert on the settling defendant's fault and the settling defendant's own rebuttal
expert. If these experts are not available to testify by subpoena,
the court should permit free use of their depositions at trial. If
these experts have not been deposed or their depositions are
inadequate, the trial judge should consider recessing trial to permit video depositions of these experts. 239
Judges should also consider using this same approach to experts in Categories One and Two-the settling defendant's experts on the fault of the remaining defendants and on the fault
of the plaintiff. If the remaining parties do not have other similar expert witnesses available to testify, the judge should take reasonable steps to insure that the jury hears the testimony of these
experts as well. It is true that the remaining parties, both plaintiff and defendant, had the opportunity and incentive to develop
dering the video deposition of the settling defendant or taking the settling defendant's
testimony out of order. This last option might be helpful in circumstances where the
jury would not otherwise hear the settling defendant's testimony until late in the trial.
237. Other evidence, such as documentary evidence of the settling defendant's fault,
will presumably have been produced for all parties during discovery. If settlement occurs at trial or on the eve of trial, that evidence may already be marked and ready for
introduction.
238. In some types of cases, professional malpractice actions for example, expert
testimony on the fault of the settling defendant will be required before the jury can
deliberate about that defendant's fault. See, e.g., Reinhardt v. Colton, 337 N.W.2d 88, 95
(Minn. 1983).
239. If this is impractical, the court should permit free use of expert reports and
interrogatory responses at trial. These are poor substitutes for depositions, however,
and place the party forced to rely on this "second-best" evidence at an unfair tactical
disadvantage.
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this evidence themselves during discovery. If they have sUIvived
summary judgment, however, and relied on the availability of
the settling defendant's experts at trial, then it seems only fair to
do what can be done to capture this evidence. 24o
Finally, as a practical matter, judges should allow the remaining parties free use at trial of depositions of settling parties and
witnesses in a settling party's control-both fact and expert witnesses. The Rules of Civil Procedure permit "an adverse party"
to use "the deposition of a party ... for any purpose."241 Trial
courts should read "the deposition of a party" to include depositions of any person who was once a party to the lawsuit, but since
has settled. Trial courts should also read "adverse party"
broadly. For purposes of using the deposition of a settling defendant, both the plaintiff and the nonsettling defendants
should be defined as "adverse" parties. 242 Free use of these depositions balances the requirement of fair fault allocation with the
settling defendant's desire for repose. Use of depositions increases the jury's ability to assess fault of the settling defendants
and may decrease the need to have those defendants-and all
their witnesses-appear at trial to testify.

240. This argument may seem reasonable with respect to the remaining defendants,
and less so with respect to the plaintiff. On the other hand, blocking a plaintifFs access
to a defendant's experts following settlement will only discourage the plaintiff from
settling with that defendant. This disincentive occurs because the plaintiff would then
find it difficult to prove the settling defendant was not at fault. For a general discussion
of the problems associated with proving fault, see supra part II.B.2.
241. MINN. R. Cry. P. 32.01 (b).
242. Free use of these depositions also requires some thinking about Rule 32.02,
which governs objections to admissibility of deposition testimony at trial. MINN. R. Cry.
P. 32.02. The rule preserves objections to admissibility "for any reason which would
require the exclusion of evidence if the witness were then present and testifYing." [d.
Practically speaking, this means that objections to form or foundation are waived unless
made at the time of the deposition. Objections to leading questions present a problem.
Federal Rule of Evidence 611 (c) permits a party to use leading questions when interrogating an adverse party or a witness identified with an adverse party. FED. R. EVID.
611 (c). Trial courts should read this rule's use of "adverse party" broadly, as well. Comparative fault and the possibility of a Pierringer settlement mean that any other party is
potentially an "adverse party." Trying to figure out whether a settling defendant was an
adverse party during the deposition or is an adverse party at trial is tricky and probably
pointless. Trial courts should permit both plaintiff and remaining defendants to use
the deposition of a settling defendant as if that defendant were an adverse party, and
should overrule any objections made in the deposition that the question posed was
leading.
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Explanation of the Settlement to the Jury

As Justice Simonett wrote, "the jury should be entitled to know
there has been a settlement and release if for no other reason
than to explain the settling tortfeasor's conspicuous absence
from the court room."243 At trial, judges need to take care that
the evidence about a settling party's fault can be presented to
the jury in a fashion the jury can understand. During the beginning of trial, the judge should explain that the plaintiff has settled with one of the defendants. 244 If counsel for the remaining
parties fails to do so during opening statement, the judge may
need to make a brief statement identifying the settling defendant and explaining that the jury will also need to assess the fault
of this defendant. 245
Prior to the close of the remaining defendant's case, the judge
should assure that the remaining defendant has had an opportunity to present evidence of the settling defendant's negligence.
Similarly, the judge should also assure that the plaintiff has had
an opportunity to rebut that evidence. Finally, the judge should
instruct the jury about assessing the settling defendant's fault,
and include that settling defendant with the other parties listed
in the apportionment question on the special verdict form.246

243. Simonett, supra note 6, at 30, quoted with approval in Frey v. Snelgrove, 269
N.W.2d 918, 923 (Minn. 1978). As Simonett also notes, the fact of the settlement is also
admissible to demonstrate the bias of a witness. [d. at 30-31; see also Johnson v. Heintz,
243 N.W.2d 815, 825 (Wis. 1976) (stating the trial court should have allowed the introduction of the fact of settlement to prove bias).
244. There is no need to disclose the amount of the settlement to the jury. It is
irrelevant. Frey, 269 N.W.2d at 923 ("[A]s a general rule the amount paid in settlement
should never be submitted."). For a complete discussion of this issue, see Simonett,
supra note 6, at 31-33.
245. See, e.g., Minn. Dist. Judges Ass'n, 4 Minn. Practice, MINN. JURY INSTRUCTION
GUIDES, Civil JIG 148-49 (3d ed. 1986 & Supp. 1992) (suggesting a jury instruction regarding the settling defendant's absence). The judge may also wish to explain how the
settlement has realigned the interests of the remaining parties. This can be done simply: "Members of the jury, the remaining defendant will try to convince you that the
settling defendant is at fault for the plaintiff's damages. The plaintiff will try to convince you that the settling defendant is not at fault, and that the fault of the remaining
defendant caused plaintiff's damages."
246. Of course, if the remaining parties fail to present sufficient evidence of the
settling defendant's fault, then the judge can direct a verdict in favor of the settling
defendant and strike its name from the apportionment question.
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CONCLUSION

Will these changes make trial easier following a Pitminger settlement? They may. Then won't these changes undermine the
remaining parties' incentive to settle? They will not. Rather,
these changes will balance the remaining parties' incentive to
settle. At present, Pitminger-created problems of fairness may
place one of the remaining parties at an enormous tactical disadvantage. 247 When this happens, the disadvantaged party has a
tremendous incentive to settle. However, as great as that incentive to settle might be, it is no greater than the opposing party's
incentive to press its advantage and proceed to trial. If the
changes proposed here eliminate some of the Pitminger-created
tactical disadvantages, they may actually help to increase the incentive to settle.
Will these changes eliminate Pitminger-created problems of unfairness? Undoubtedly not, but they may help. Within ethical
limits, nothing can or should prevent imaginative trial lawyers
from finding seams in the fabric of law and using those seams to
their client's advantage. The changes suggested here may help
correct some of the problems that Pitminger releases have created. More important, we should incorporate the processes of
discovery, litigation, and trial into our thinking and writing
about law. These processes are the inherent and inevitable context in which our notions of law must be played out and proved.
If we are to understand new ideas about law, we must understand how those ideas will influence litigation and trial and how,
in turn, litigation and trial will shape the application of our
ideas.
This awareness of the effect of litigation and trial-and of
their context-has never figured significantly in writings about
Pitminger releases. The problems with Pitminger releases are, in a
very real sense, the expected residue of the willingness to dismiss
allocation of fault to settling defendants as "merely a part of the
mechanics by which the ... negligence of the nonsettling tortfeasor is determined. "248 Litigation and trial are anything but
"mere mechanics." Trial is the proving ground for Pitminger releases; trial is where Pitminger releases must sink or swim.
247. In many cases, the remaining party with the greatest tactical disadvantage will
be the remaining defendant. As argued in Section II, however, the disadvantage may
sometimes be the plaintiff's.
248. Pierringer v. Hoger, 124 N.W.2d 106, 112 (Wis. 1963).
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The guidance given to the trial bench and bar about Pierringer
releases has been drained of almost any reference to the context
in which those releases must be used. On the parched page of
the appellate opinion, Pierringer releases seem to work very well
indeed. However, immersed in the fluid environment of the
courtroom, Peirringer releases too often sink. We should not
have expected more. We forgot to mention the water.

HeinOnline -- 20 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 79 1994

HeinOnline -- 20 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 80 1994

